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The   Principle   of   the    Ego   in    Philosophy   with 

Special  Reference  to  its  Influence  upon 

SchlegePs  Doctrine  of  "Ironie" 


BY 


AUGUSTA  MANIE  WILSON,  A.M. 


April,  1908 


5 


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(17 

TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


PAGB 

Introduction— 

Problem  of  the  "Self."     Subjective  and  Objective 9 

I.  Principle  of  the  Self. 

Historical  Orientation. 

1.  With  Vedanta. 

a.  Hindoo  thought,  a  reduction  from  thirty-three  gods, 
through  Prajapati  and  Brahman  to  Self 9 

b.  Upanishads-Khandogya — tat  twam  asi. 

Brihadaranyaka — aham  brahma  asmi 10 

c.  Vedanta-Sutras  of  Shankara.  Identification  of  Self  and 
Brahman 10 

d.  Conclusion — Emancipation  of  soul,  and  annihilation  of 

Self.    Absolute  Nirvana H 

2.  The  Socratic  Self-knowledge. 

"Know  thyself" — Virtue  is  knowledge — Socratic  "irony" — 
apparent  abnegation  of  Self — opinions  vs.  knowledge.  Ends 
in  ethical  eudaemonism 11 

3.  The  Self  in  Christianity. 

Origin  of  Religion — Ego's  sense  of  need.  Phase — psycho- 
logical. Negation  of  world  and  affirmation  of  Self.  End — 
Kingdom  of  God 12 

4.  The  Cartesian  Self. 

Maxim — "  Cogito,  ergo  sum" — Cf.  Vedanta.  Mens,  res 
cogitans  ;  corpus,  res  extensa.  Ethical  ideal — reason  vs. 
sensibility.     Mind  and  matter  merge  in  God 13 

5.  The  Fichtean  Ego. 

"  Wissenschaftslehre." 
1  st.    Affirmation  of  the  Ego.      2d.    Negation  of  the  Ego= 
Non-ego.      3d.    Limitation  of  the  Ego's  activity.     Ethical 
purpose— to  develop  character 14 

Conclusion  and  Transition  to  Romantic  School 16 

II.  Ideals  of  Romanticism. 

Their  Origin. 

1.  Fundamental  idea — to  reconcile  philosophy  and  poetry 17 

2.  Phases — subjectivity — sesthetical  love  of  the  picturesque 

and  mysterious  (Tieck) — reactionary  (Wackenroder) 18 

3.  Cause— opposition  to  art-formalism  of  Winckelmann  and 
Lessing,  and  to  classicism  of  Goethe  and  Schiller 17 

4.  Influences— (a)  philosophical,  {b)  political,  (c)  poetical 18 


296277 


(a)  Philosophical, 
i.     Kant's  M  Critique  of  Judgment." 

Beauty    pleases    without    interest — a    universal    without   a 

concept — a  play  of  the  faculties — subjective 18 

Influence  on  period  :  subjectivity,  and  free  play 20 

2.     Fichte. 

The  Ego  and  its  activity  vs.  the  Non-ego.      Fichte  ethical, 

Romanticism  sesthetical,  how  relate  them:    (1)   Ego   and 

its  infinite  doing— (2)  Culture  idea  in  "  Urtheile  uber  die 

franzosische    Revoluzion." 
Influence  on  Romanticism  :  freedom  of  culture,  subjectivity, 

infinite  doing 23 

(5)  Political. 

The  French  Revolution 23 

Rousseau's  freedom  in  Nature,  emphasis  on  individual 23 

Influence:  egoism,  freedom 23 

(c)  Poetical. 

1.  Goethe. 

Classicism  and  utilitarianism 23 

"Wilhelm    Meister"  —  "Sorrows    of   Young   Werther" — 

"Faust" — from  egoism  to  altruism.   Opposed  by  Roman- 
ticists      23 

Positive    Influence  :     individualism,    freedom    from    moral 

restraint 24 

2.  Schiller. 

a.  "The  ^Esthetical  Letters." 

" Spiel-trieb" — play  between  sense  and  reason.  Art,  from 
physical  to  moral 24 

b.  "  Uber  Naive  und  sentimentalishe  Dichtung."  Naive — 
ancient — all     form — no     life.      Sentimental — modern — all 

fancy — reflection 25 

Influence  on  Romanticism  : 
Struggle  of  artist  to  unite  real   and  ideal.     Basis  for  all 
philosophy  of  Romanticism 27 

III.  Schlegel's  "Ironie"— 

1.  Influence  of  Schiller. 

Schiller's  naive  and  sentimental  poetry.  Schlegel's  "Die 
Griechen  und  Romer" — defines  ancient  (classic)  and  modern 
poetry 27 

2.  Influence  of  Fichte. 

Egoism — free  activity  of  Ego 3r 

3.  Influence  of  Goethe. 

"Gesprach  ueber  die  Poesie." 32 

"Characteristiken  und  Kritiken." ^ 

Uber  Wilhelm  Meister. 

Modern  art  called  Romantic 33 

Classic—lost  in  material 33 

Romantic— fancy  beyond  reality 33 


4.  "  Die  Ironie  "—An  unending  play  of  fancy,  no  goal,  ever  striving 3 

"  Ueber  die  Unverstandlichkeit  "—kinds  of  "  Ironie."  Frag- 
mente — "Athenaeum,"  "Lyceum,"  "Ideen."  Criticism 
and  aphorisms  on  "Ironie, "(subjective,  sesthetical,  ethical, 
religious,  logical,  pessimistic) 35 

'* Lucinde" — freedom  in  society 40 

5.  Schlegel's  ' '  Ironie ' '  contrasted  with  Socratic  and  Christian  irony 41 

6.  His  Influence. 

Philosophy :  Novalis,  Schelling,  Solger.  Literature :  Tieck, 
Wackenroder.    Religion:  Schleiermacher 43 

7.  His  Effect. 

Literature :  Grillparzer  and  Lenau.  Philosophy  :  Schopen- 
hauer— objectless  will 48 

Wagner  and  Nietzsche. 
Ibsen,  Hauptmann,  Sudermann. 
Schopenhauer's  return    to  Vedanta — "  Ex  oriente  lux" — 

"will  is  world,  world  is  nothing" 53 

IV.  Conclusion. 

Self  as  fundamental  principle  leads  to 

1.  Nihilism 53 

2.  Pessimism — "Weltschmerz" 54 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Boyesen,  Hjalmar  Hjorth — Essays  on  German  Literature. 

Erdmann,  Johann — History   of    Philosophy — Vol.   II.     Translated   by   W.    S. 
Hough. 

Eucken,  Rudolph — Fundamental  Concepts  of  Modern   Philosophic  Thought — 
Translated  by  M.  S.  Phelps. 

Fichte,  J.   G. — i.     Wissenschaftslehre — Werke  Band   I.     2.   Ueber  die   franzo- 
sische  Revoluzion — sammtliche  Werke — (Berlin,  1845)  Band  VI  und  VII. 

Goethe,  Johann  W. — Sorrows  of  Young  Werther — Bohn.  Lib.  ed. 
Faust — German   ed. — Calvin   Thomas. 
Wilhelm  Meister — Translated  by  Thos.  Carlyle. 

Haym,  Rudolph — Die  romantische  Schule. 

Kant,    Immanuel — Critique   of    Pure    Reason — Translated   by    Max    Muller. 
Critique  of  Judgment — Translated  by  J.  H.  Bernard. 

Lessing,  Gotth.  E. — Education  of  the  Human  Race.    Translated  by  Robertson. 

Minor,     J. — Friedrich     Schlegel — Prosaische     Jugendschriften     (Vienna,    1906) 
Bd.  I  und  II. 

Novalis — Schriften  (Berlin,  1846). 

Schriften  (Berlin,  1815)   Bd.  I  und  II. 

Paulsen,  Friedrich — A  System  of  Ethics — Translated  by  Frank  Thilly. 

Robertson,  John  G. — History  of  German  Literature. 

Schiller,  Johann  F. — The  ^Esthetic  Letters — Translated  by  J.   Weiss. 

Naive  and  Sentimental  Poetry — Bohn.     Lib.  ed. 
Werke — Gustav  Hempel  (Berlin). 

Schlegel,  Friedrich — J.  Minor  Prosaische  Jugendschriften. 
Athenaeum,  Lyceum,  Ideen.     Fragmente. 
Characteristiken  und  Kritiken  ueber  W.  Meister. 
Ueber  die  Griechen  und  Romer. 
Ueber  die  Unverstandlichkeit. 
Gesprach  iiber  die  Poesie. 
"Lucinde" — Universal-Bibliothek — Reclam.     Leipsig. 


Schleiermacher,  Friedrich — On  Religion— Translated  by  J.  Oman. 

Schopenhauer,  Arthur — The  World  as  Will  and  Idea — Translated  by  Hal- 
dane  and  Kemp. 

Shaw,  Charles  Gray — Christianity  and  Culture. 

Upanishads — Sacred   Books   of   the   East    Vol.    I,   XV — Translated   by    Max 
Muller. 

Vedanta — Deussen:     English  translation. 

Wagner,  Richard — Essay  on  Beethoven — Translated  by  A.  R.  Parsons. 

Windelband,  W. — History  of  Philosophy — Translated  by  James  H.  Tufts. 
Geschichte  der  neuen  Philosophic     Bd.  I. 


INTRODUCTION 


The  problem  of  the  Self  involves  profound  thought  in  philosophic 
systems  where  it  forms  the  fundamental  principle. 

There  are  two  possible  paths  open  to  philosophic  speculation:  one 
based  on  the  subject,  or  the  soul  within,  the  other  on  the  object,  or 
world  without.  The  second  method  carries  the  philosopher  into  the 
depths  of  materialism,  or  the  rigor  of  dogmatism. 

The  first  method,  where  the  Self  is  the  keystone,  leads  to  the 
various  results  of  subjectivism,  idealism,  scepticism  and  "Ironie;" 
this  latter,  we  purpose  to  show,  finds  its  true  source  in  the  doctrine 
of  the  Self.  As  types  of  subjectivism  and  idealism,  the  Vedanta 
philosophy,  the  Socratic  ethics,  the  Christian  Self  and  the  Fichtean 
Ego  will  be  examined:     as  type  of  scepticism  the  Cartesian  maxim. 

The  climax  of  the  Ego-lehre  is  "Die  Ironie":  when  the  subjec- 
tive Self  formulates  ideals  to  which  it  strives  to  attain,  and  the  awful 
gulf  between  the  real  and  ideal  is  perceived,  in  the  endless  striving 
and  longing  for  a  goal,  the  "Ironie"  is  experienced.  This  "Ironie" 
was  first  defined  by  Friedrich  Schlegel.  His  doctrine  influenced  and 
affected  many  writers,  the  "Ironie"  leading  them  into  a  world  of 
dream  or  phantasy,  but  at  length  culminating  in  the  darkest  pessimism. 

I.     Principle  of  the  Self — Historical  Orientation. 
i.  With  Vedanta. 

In  earliest  Hindoo  thought,  the  Vedic  hymns  were  addressed  to 
thirty-three  gods;  then  came  a  longing  for  one,  who  might  be  a  god 
of  gods,  and  such  a  being  was  Prajapati,  who  was  conceived  of  as 
having  a  locality  and  moving  about  the  earth.  Not  yet  content,  a 
deity,  Brahman  was  worshipped,  and  finally  came  a  philosophic 
conception  of  the  Self,  where  Brahman  is  identified  with  the  ego  and 
the  Self  is  in  all.  It  is  a  pantheistic  form  of  religion,  wherein  the 
Ego  is  the  Infinite  and  everything  is  a  manifestation  of  the  Self. 

The  Upanishads  contain  the  philosophy  of  the  Vedas,  i.  e.,  Vedanta. 
Their  aim  was  to  impress  belief  in  one  Spirit,  who  is  the  Creator;  as 
also  a  faith  in  the  world's  reality,  dependent  on  Brahman ;  and  the 
human  soul  as  identical  with  Brahman,  whence  it  emanates.     In  the 


Khandogya-Upanishad,  the  sacred  syllable  "Om"  is  explained  as  the 
essence  of  all  in  earth,  sky,  and  man  till  Brahman  is  finally  reached  as 
the  cause  of  the  universe.  This  Brahman  is  "my  self  within  the 
heart  ...  he,  from  whom  all  works,  all  desires  proceed,  who 
embraces  all  this,  who  never  speaks,  and  who  is  never  surprised,  he 
is  myself  within  my  heart,  is  the  Brahman.  When  I  shall  have  departed 
from  hence,  I  shall  obtain  him  (that  Self)."1  "The  subtle  essence  of 
all  that  exists  is  the  True,  is  the  Self,  and  Thou  art  it  (Tat  twam  asi)."2 
The  Infinite  is  everywhere,  but  it  is  the  Self,  from  which  all  things 
spring.  He  who  sees  this  shall  not  taste  death  but  shall  enter  the  City 
of  Brahman  and  secure  freedom  from  all  worlds  and  cares. 

The  Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad  is  based  on  the  tenet  "I  am  a  Brah- 
man" (aham  brahma  asmi).3  In  the  beginning  was  the  Self,  or  Brah- 
man, who  created  all  things,  in  earth,  in  sky,  in  spirit  world.  This 
Brahman  is  "thy  Self,  the  Immortal,  the  Imperishable."4 

The  Vedanta  is  the  culmination  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Upanishads. 
It  attempts  to  explain  the  statements  set  forth  in  the  Upanishads,  "tat 
twam  asi,"  and  "aham  brahma  asmi,"  and  asks  why  are  we  not  conscious 
of  the  identification  of  Self  and  Brahman,  and  why  is  there  the  difficulty 
of  Self  vs.  not-Self,  the  subject  and  the  object?  Vedanta  answers  that 
the  difficulty  arises  through  ignorance,  or  illusion  (Maya).  As  mother- 
of-pearl  appears  silver,  as  a  rope  may  seem  a  snake,  or  the  moon  as 
double,  so  the  Self  appears  as  two  through  Maya.  The  theology  of  the 
Vedanta  consists  in  emancipation  and  cessation  from  transmigration. 
When  Self  is  known  to  be  one  with  Brahman,  there  is  complete  libera- 
tion from  care  and  the  soul  goes  to  Brahman,  never  to  return.  The 
cosmology  presents  two  views:  an  empirical  world  for  the  transmi- 
gration of  souls  and  a  metaphysical  world  where  Brahman  and  the 
soul  are  identical;  where  there  is  no  beginning,  no  continuance,  no 
end.  "As  clay  vessels  are  clay,  but  differ  in  name,  so  all  is  Brahman, 
differing  in  name.  The  world  has  no  existence,  is  all  Brahman."5 
Cause  and  effect  are  identical,  the  substance  persists  in  changes  of  its 
qualities,  world  is  an  objectification  of  the  Self.  The  empirical  world 
is  illusion,  or  Maya. 

The  psychology  in  Vedanta  that  the  soul  alone  is  real  is  the  fore- 
runner of  Descartes,  "Cogito,  ergo  sum"  The  soul  is  one  with 
Brahman,  not  part,  but  the  whole;  it  is  all  powerful.  Rebirth  is 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  soul's  own  nature  is  hidden  under  various 

i   Kh-U.    III.     14:    3,    4.       (Max    Mtiller  Sacred    Books,    Vol.    I.) 

2  K.  U.  VI.  8.  7. 

3  B.  U.   1—4.    10— (Sacred  Books,   Vol.   XV.) 

4  B.  U.  3.  7,  8. 

5  K.  U.  VI.  1.  4. 


II 

conditions  which  prevent  total  identification  with  Brahman.  After 
death  begins  the  migration  of  the  soul;  the  bad  man  is  born  again 
as  a  lower  animal;  the  man  with  lower  knowledge  enters  into  lower 
Brahman,  descends  into  a  higher  caste  and  by  progressive  emancipa- 
tion enters  finally  into  eternal  and  absolute  Nirvana;  the  soul  with 
higher  knowledge  reaches  immediate  emancipation.  This  is  the  key- 
note of  Vedanta,  emancipation  through  knowledge  of  the  Self, 
hidden  in  the  body,  "a  patched-together  hiding  place."1  This  knowl- 
edge is  attained  by  study  of  Veda,  renunciation  of  pleasure,  attain- 
ment of  control  of  body,  meditation  and  contemplation  of  "tat  twam 
asi"  Knowledge  immediately  identifies  Self  with  Brahman,  and  sees 
the  non-reality  of  the  world.  There  is  no  world,  no  body,  no  pain 
for  the  knowing  one  for  "I  am  a  Brahman,"  non-actor  and  non- 
enjoyer.  At  the  moment  of  death,  a  complete  and  eternal  emancipa- 
tion begins  for  the  enlightened  one.  He  is  a  Brahman  and  in  Brah- 
man is  he  merged.  "As  rivers  run,  and  in  the  ocean  renouncing 
name  and  form,  from  vision  vanish,  so  names  and  forms  the  enlight- 
ened Sage  renouncing,  enters  great  Brahman,  the  all-embracing 
Spirit."2 

With  complete  emancipation,  comes  annihilation  of  Self;  Absolute 
Nirvana  is  reached  but  with  the  nihilism  of  the  soul,  a  blotting  out 
of  things.  Death  is  the  end  of  all.  From  the  most  definite  and 
real  worship  of  many  gods,  Hindoo  thought  passed  to  the  most 
indefinite  and  unreal  Self  and  this  belief  embodied  in  the  Vedanta 
philosophy  culminates  in  nihilism,  a  complete  obliteration  of  Self. 

2.  The  Socratic  Self -knowledge. 

Previous  to  the  conquest  of  Persia,  the  Greeks  had  been  ruled 
by  tradition  and  custom ;  laws  were  followed  blindly  with  unques- 
tioned belief  in  their  validity.  Now  the  Sophists  declared  "Man  is 
the  measure  of  all  things,"  what  each  man  thinks  is  for  him  the 
truth.  From  the  study  of  the  cosmos,  Greek  thought  had  turned  to 
the  study  of  man.  Natural  law  was  now  opposed  to  law  of  custom; 
the  Sophists  held  that  natural  law  was  the  only  genuine  law  and  that 
opinions  of  men  were  to  reign  supreme.  Contrary  to  this  idea,  Socrates 
emphasized  the  elements  of  knowledge  and  reason.  The  Sophists 
obeyed  law  if  for  their  own  interests  and  put  an  end  to  a  blind  following 
of  law.  Socrates  agreed  with  their  purpose  but  urged  all  to  follow  the 
law  by  the  use  of  reason,  and  to  obey  the  law,  because  it  was  the  law. 

i  b.  u.  4-4-". 

2  3  Mundaka. 


12 

Socrates  held  that  it  were  better  to  do  wrong  knowingly,  than  the 
right  blindly,  and  made  a  universal  truth  of  "Virtue  is  knowledge  of 
the  good"  and  can  be  taught  and  sin  is  an  error.  The  best  kind 
of  life  is  that  which  a  man  leads  by  the  exercise  of  his  reason  and 
in  strict  conformity  to  law.  According  to  Socrates,  all  excellence  is 
insight,  or  exact  knowledge.  His  maxim  was  "Know  thyself."  Man 
should  know  his  own  reason  and  have  an  exact  knowledge  of  things 
in  civil  and  political  life.  Socrates'  purpose  was  the  welfare  of  the 
State  through  the  individual's  self-knowledge.  His  was  an  ethical 
knowledge,  seeking  the  happiness  of  all.  He  made  the  great  distinc- 
tion between  opinion  and  knowledge  by  means  of  his  irony.  This 
irony,  however,  is  not  the  modern  doctrine,  as  will  be  seen  when  com- 
parison is  made  later.  His  is  a  dialectic  irony,  which  is  evident  in  the 
dialogues  of  Plato.1  By  a  pretended  abnegation  of  his  own  knowledge, 
the  adversary's  opinions  are  put  in  the  foreground  until  all  further 
argument  to  support  them  is  impossible  and  the  opinions  sink  to  naught 
by  their  own  absurdity.  By  feigning  ignorance  and  dullness,  he  drew 
out  the  opinions  of  others  and  finally  caused  the  opponent  to  pass 
judgment  on  himself.  He  dropped  his  own  individuality,  that  others 
might  see  the  error  in  opinions  and  be  led  to  self-knowledge  by 
reason.  Here  we  again  see  the  spirit  of  nihilism,  in  the  abnegation 
of  Self,  that  reason  and  knowledge  may  reign  and  an  ethical  eudae- 
monism  be  brought  about  in  the  State. 


3.    The  Self  in  Christicmity. 

Ancient  life  was  characterized  by  a  feeling  of  na'ive  complacency, 
but  even  with  the  Stoics  is  discerned  a  feeling  of  need  for  a  higher 
power  to  save  us  and  lead  us  to  the  ideal  of  virtue.  A  feeling  of  unrest 
abounds  caused  by  the  self-diremption  of  the  human  soul.  The  Neo- 
Platonists  attain  rest  only  in  the  moment  of  ecstasy  when  the  person- 
ality of  the  individual  is  lost  in  the  Absolute. 

Religion  has  its  origin  in  the  Self.  The  religious  feeling  is  within 
man's  own  nature. 

Man  contemplates  the  evil  and  discontent  about  him  and  longs  for 
salvation  from  these  ills.  He  needs  help  and  so  a  Deity  is  formulated. 
Man  worships  and  by  God's  help  may  be  saved. 

Christianity  sets  up  the  dualism  of  soul  and  world.  Man  must 
negate  the  world  in  order  to  save  his  soul,  he  must  lose  his  body  to  find 
his   soul's   salvation.     The   goal   of   the   Ego's   striving  through   life 

1  (Jf.  Thesetetus,      Philebus,    Gorgias. 


13 

is  the  "Kingdom  of  God."  The  Ego  must  renounce  the  world  and 
all  egoistic  natural  desires  and  become  one  with  the  Infinite  in  the 
Eternal  Kingdom.  Man  is  free  to  develop  his  own  character  and  to 
realize  the  Kingdom,  and  God  is  supreme  in  perfecting  this  home. 
Both  man  and  God  have  one  goal,  the  Kingdom.  The  Ego  must  lose 
himself  and  become  one  with  God.  There  is  a  complete  renunciation 
and  resignation  of  the  Ego  in  Christianity.  The  worldly  individual 
must  be  negated  and  the  spiritual  soul  affirmed.  Again  the  Ego  loses 
its  identity,  merged  in  the  Infinite  in  the  Kingdom  of  God. 

4.    The  Cartesian  Self. 

Descartes'  theory  is  dependent  upon  the  "inner  experience"  of  St. 
Augustine  and  the  ontological  proof  of  God's  existence  set  forth  by 
Anselm.  He  was  the  modern  sceptic,  he  began  by  doubting  and 
changed  Anselm's  "Credo,  ut  intelligam"  to  "dubito,  ut  intelligam" 
As  the  senses  deceive,  he  finds  it  necessary  to  exercise  thought  in  order 
to  doubt.  In  this,  he  is  a  rationalist.  I  doubt,  therefore  I  think;  and 
if  I  think,  I  am.  Thus  "Cogito,  ergo  sum"1  the  maxim  was  estab- 
lished that  the  thinking  being,  the  Self,  exists.  This  is  comparable  to 
the  Vedanta  conception  of  the  identification  of  all  in  the  Self. 
If  the  Self  exists,  all  else  exists.  The  soul  is  the  thinking  thing  (res 
cogitans)  and  the  body,  the  object  projected  by  thought  (res 
extensa)}  This  antithesis  has  set  the  problem  for  modern  thought; 
the  soul  is  a  'thing  and  its  content  is  thought ;  then,  how  does  the 
inner  soul  relate  to  the  external  body,  how  can  subjective  relate  to 
objective? 

Descartes  applies  the  attribute  of  extension  and  declares  interaction 
to  be  a  miracle.  It  is  a  real  but  unintelligent  connection,  due  to  the 
pineal  gland  of  the  brain.  There  is  a  dualism,  but  "mens  and  corpus 
are  on  the  same  level  with  a  possible  relation.  His  "cogito,  ergo  sum" 
is  a  truth  grasped  by  immediate  intuition ;  it  forms  one  of  the  elemen- 
tary truths  of  consciousness.  Innate  ideas  are  clear  and  distinct  ideas, 
non-deducible,  ground  solely  in  themselves.  They  are  as  clear  and 
distinct  as  self -consciousness  and  he  cannot  doubt  consciousness.  Judg- 
ment as  to  the  distinction  between  distinct  and  confused  presentations 
is  founded  on  the  will  power.  Descartes'  ethics  rest  on  this  method ; 
from  distinct  knowledge  follows  right  willing  and  acting;  from  the 
confused  impulses,  result  sin  and  error.  This  ethical  ideal  reminds  one 
of  Socrates'  rule  of  reason  over  sense. 

1  Meditations    II.    and    VI. 

2  Meditations    II.    and    VI. 


14 

Descartes  made  a  threefold  division  of  the  world ;  mind,  matter  and 
God.  Then  as  substance  is  that  which  can  be  conceived  of  as  itself 
alone,  mind  and  matter  are  not  substances  as  they  cannot  be  con- 
ceived of  as  apart  from  God;  so  only  God  exists.  He  overcomes 
dualism  by  relating  all  things  to  God.  Mind  and  matter  no  longer 
exist.    All  merge  into  God  as  the  Brahmanic  Self  into  Nirvana. 

5.  The  Fichtean  Ego. 

With  Fichte,  Cartesianism  seems  to  be  inverted;  not  "Cogito"  but 
"Ago,"  not  thought  but  "Thathandlung"  Goethe's  "Faust,"  about 
this  time  meditates  on  "Im  Anfang  war  die  That"1  This  forms  the 
basis  of  the  Fichtean  philosophy.  His  is  a  voluntaristic  method,  follow- 
ing a  dialectical  movement.  The  Ego  posits  itself  (Das  Ich  setzt  sich 
selbst,  well  es  ist.)2  Fichte  would  say  "sum,  ergo  sum"  (Ich  bin  Ich) 
not  "Cogito,  ergo  sum!'  It  is  the  nature  of  this  Ego  to  act,  not  in  a 
contemplative  direction,  but  ethically.  The  Ego  therefore  opposes  to 
itself  a  Non-ego  on  which  it  acts  and  reacts.  (Aber  das  dem  Ich 
entgegengesetzte  ist-Nicht-Ich.)s  The  outer  world  is  nothing,  except 
a  projection  of  the  Ego,  and  exists  as  an  obstacle  which  the  Ego  must 
overcome  in  order  to  develop  character. 

The  Ego's  self -activity  (Thathandlung)4  acting  on  the  world  will 
result  in  "die  sittliche  Weltordnung."  We  have  first  the  affirmation 
and  activity  of  a  subject;  second,  an  object,  world,  a  product  of  the 
Ego,  and  opposed  for  ethical  development;  and  third,  a  limitation,  as 
Ego  and  Non-ego  act  on  each  other  as  will  and  thought  meet.  How 
can  Ego  and  Non-ego,  be  considered  together,  without  canceling 
each  other?  They  mutually  limit  each  other.  (Sein  und  Nicht-sein 
Realitdt  und  Negation  werden  sich  gegenseitig  einschrdnken)  .5  To 
limit  means  a  canceling  in  part;  the  Non-ego  is  what  the  Ego  is  not, 
and  vice  versa.  Ego  and  Non-ego  possess  reality,  divisibility,  and 
negation.  They  may  be  united  thus :  Ich  setze  im  Ich  dem  theilbaren 
Ich  ein  theilbares  Nicht-Ich  entgegen.6  Such  a  synthesis  posits  activity 
(Thatigkeit)7  and  may  be  called  the  synthesis  of  causality  (Wirksam 
keit)*  The  Ego  represents  the  active  cause,  and  the  Non-ego,  the 
passive  effect.9  The  Ego  is  a  feeling  Ego  and  posits  a  Non-ego  (ein 
Objekt)10  upon  which  it  reflects  and  contemplates ;  a  reflecting  Ego,  and 
a  reflected  Ego,  or  Non-ego.     The  Ego  is  free  in  acting,  but  if  it 

1  Faust — Thomas    ed.    Pt.    I.    1.  1237.           6  Ibid.  s.   no. 

2  Werke — Band    I.    s.    96,    97.  7  Ibid.  s.   136. 

3  Werke — Band    I.    s.     104.  8  Ibid.  s.   136. 

4  Ibid.  s.  91.  9  Ibid.  s.   137. 

5  Ibid.  s.  108.  10  Ibid.  s.  200. 


15 

reflects  on  the  act,  it  ceases  to  be  free  and  the  act  becomes  product. 
Here  arises  the  distinction  between  reality  and  ideality,  representation 
and  the  thing-in-itself.  Freedom,  or  the  Ego's  activity,  is  the  uniting 
link.  The  Ego  must  posit  itself,  and  it  also  posits  a  Non-ego;  there 
a  centripetal  and  here  a  centrifugal  force;  there  as  an  Ego  reflecting 
and  here  as  reflected  upon.  The  relation  of  the  infinite  self-activity 
of  the  Ego  to  its  object  is  a  tendency  toward  self-determination, 
an  unending  strife;  (Eine  Tendenz  zur  Bestimmung,  ein  Streben,  ein 
unendliches  Streben.)1 

This  striving  is  an  impulse  (ein  Trieb)2  in  the  subject  which  forces 
it  to  posit  a  Non-ego,  and  the  counter  activity  of  the  Non-ego  is  a 
check  (Gegenstreben) ,  the  balance  of  the  two  is  feeling  (Gefiihl).  In 
the  feeling  is  united  activity  (Thdtigkeit)  and  limitation  (Beschrdnk- 
ung.).  This  feeling  is  caused  by  reflection;  the  activity  is  a  yearn- 
ing (Sehnen)3 ;  an  impulse  toward  the  unknown,  a  dissatisfaction 
(Misbehagen)  and  a  want  (Leere)  to  be  filled.  In  yearning,  ideality 
and  impulse  (Trieb  nach  Realitdt)  are  closely  united.4  If  the  Ego 
posits  this  harmony  it  must  also  posit  an  opposite  which  would  be 
accompanied  by  a  feeling  of  disapproval  (disharmony  between  impulse 
and  act).  The  harmonious  is  to  be  impulse  (Trieb)  and  act  (Hand- 
lung).  Each  is  to  determine  and  be  determined  together.  If  an 
impulse  produced  itself,  merely  for  impulse,  it  would  be  an  act  like 
the  categorical  imperative,  simply  because  it  is  done  with  self-deter- 
mination, without  an  object.  They  should  be  reciprocally  related;  then 
harmony  and  satisfaction  (Zufriedenheit)  prevail.  This  lasts  only 
a  little,  as  yearning  returns.  If  act  is  opposed  to  impulse,  a  feeling 
of  dissatisfaction  arises,  a  self-diremption  of  the  subject  (der  Ent- 
zweiung  des  Subjekts  mit  sich  selbst).5 

The  Ego  is  the  basis  from  which  regularity  and  harmony  proceed. 
Reality  is  simply  the  product  of  the  Ego;  "Die  Philosophie  lehrt  uns 
alles  im  Ich  aufsuchen."6  Back  of  all  is  the  moral  will,  which  creates 
the  world,  for  a  field  of  action.  Fichte's  is  an  idealism,  which  sees  in 
all  things  a  product  of  consciousness.  "Was  man  fiir  ein  Mensch  isf1 
determines  his  philosophy.  The  activity  of  the  Ego  is  to  develop 
character.  It  was  the  individualism  and  ethics  of  Fichte  which  the 
Romanticists  followed.  "In  ihrem  innersten  Kern  war  die  Wissen- 
shaftslehre  Ethik;  die  moralische  Weltordnung  war  das  Herz,  von  dem 
sie  die  Pulse  des  Alls  ausgehen  Hess."9,    Fichte's  distinction  between  the 

i   Ibid.  s.  261.  5  s.  328. 

2  Ibid.  s.  288.  6  s.  412. 

3  Ibid.  s.  302.  7  s.  434. 

4  Ibid.  s.  320.  8  Haym's  Romantische  Schule — s.  218,  219. 


i6 

absolute  and  the  empirical  Ego  formed  a  problem  for  Friedrich 
Schlegel.  Kant  had  separated  noumenon  and  phenomenon  and  now 
Fichte  declared  that  the  absolute  Ego  rules  in  philosophy,  yet  since 
complete  freedom  remains  an  ideal,  the  absolute  is  never  reached. 
Fichte  does  not  advance  beyond  Kant.  The  activity  of  the  Ego,  to 
reach  the  ideal  exerted  a  great  influence  on  the  period  of  Roman- 
ticism. 

Let  us,  however,  briefly  sum  up  these  five  phases  of  self-doctrine: 
with  Vedanta,  Self  was  the  Infinite ;  the  individual  Self  must  be 
annihilated  and  identified  with  the  Brahmanic  Self,  before  Nirvana 
could  be  enjoyed;  it  results  in  total  obliteration  of  the  personal  self — ■ 
nihilism.  In  the  Socratic  ethics,  Socrates  denied  himself  in  order 
to  develop  others ;  this  was  an  effacement  of  the  personal  to  bring  about 
a  eudaemonistic  result  in  the  State.  The  Christian  Self  must  be  lost, 
so  that  it  can  be  found  in  the  "Kingdom" ;  it  is  a  loss  of  Self  on  earth 
for  a  new  Self  above.  The  Cartesian  sceptic  must  believe  in  personal 
existence  and  in  a  God's  existence  and  blends  the  Self  in  the  true 
substance,  God;  like  the  Vedanta,  the  individual  is  absorbed  by  the 
Infinite. 

Therefore  we  have  found  that  the  personal  must  be  done  away 
with  in  order  to  realize  a  greater  Self  or  realm.  With  Fichte,  we  have 
the  transition  to  the  Romantic  School.  The  Fichtean  Ego  does  not 
become  obliterated  but  strives  in  endless  activity  to  realize  itself  in 
a  world,  which  it  posits.  This  Ego  positing  an  ideal,  never  reaches  the 
Absolute,  but  ceaselessly  strives  for  the  goal. 

Let  us  now  examine  the  Romantic  period  to  study  the  Fichtean 
influence  and  to  find  where  the  striving  Ego  will  lead  us. 

II.  Ideals  of  Romanticism  ;  Their  Origin. 

Two  years  before ,  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century  in  Berlin 
a  reaction  in  philosophy  and  literature  was  expressed  by  the  new 
Romantic  School.    How  did  it  arise? 

German  thought  had  been  passing  through  an  age  of  Enlighten- 
ment, with  Winckelmann  and  Lessing  as  the  chief  representatives.  It 
was  a  period  marked  by  "narrowness  of  vision,  a  crude  intellectual 
complacency,  utter  absence  of  imagination  and  extreme  utilitarianism"1 
The  supremacy  of  reason  was  to  be  established  by  means  of  sesthetical 
criticism.  According  to  Winckelmann,  the  ancients  formulated  their 
ideals  of  beauty  in  much  the  same  way  as  Socrates  formed  the  ethical 

i   Boyesen — Essays,    p.    285. 


17 

concepts.  Through  the  dialogue,  Socrates  learned  his  opponents'  opin- 
ions and  united  these  into  a  universal;  so  Phidias  and  Praxiteles 
formed  a  composite  ideal  from  a  feature  here  and  there.  These  ideals, 
though  beautiful,  were  not  characteristic;  but  Winckelmann  lays 
emphasis  on  the  passiveness  of  these  classical  ideals;  "Nach  diesem 
Begriff  soil  die  Schonheit  sein,  wie  das  vollkommenste  Wasser,  welches 
je  weniger  Geschmack  es  hat,  desto  gesunder  geachtet  *wird,  well  es  von 
fremden  Theilen  geldutert  zvird."1  The  absence  of  qualities,  "eine  stille 
Grosse  und  edle  Einfalt,"  mark  the  finest  art  which  appeals  to  the 
intellect,  not  the  emotions. 

Lessing  accepts  this  theory  and  it  forms  the  nucleus  of  his  "Lao- 
koon,  or  Theory  of  Limits."  Art  must  be  beautiful,  so  Laokoon  does 
not  scream ;  this  would  be  unfitting  as  art  must  represent  what  is  static 
and  permanent.  Art,  i.  e.,  painting  and  sculpture,  is  limited  in  the 
spatial  realm  as  it  must  show  co-existence.  Poetry  appeals  to  the 
mind  through  the  ear  and  employs  the  medium  of  time.  Art  has  its 
limits.  Lessing  sets  up  the  antique  ideal  of  quietude  and  complacency 
as  the  type  of  pure  art. 

In  religion,  also,  Lessing  endeavored  to  emphasize  the  rational.  In 
his  "Erziehung  des  Menschen  Geschlechts"  he  argues  the  problem,  "Die 
zufalligen  Geschichtswahrheiten  konnen  nie  der  Beweis  fur  die 
ewigen  Vernunftwahrheiten  werden,"  by  making  revelation  for  the 
race,  analogous  to  education  of  the  individual.  Revelation  is  a  means 
of  communicating  the  truths  of  God's  Fatherhood  and  Kingdom  and 
the  soul's  immortality.  It  was  an  intellectualistic  revelation  for  it 
confined  itself  to  the  communication  of  speculative  knowledge.2 

During  this  period  literary  men  were  seeking  to  revive  interest  in 
Greek  authors  and  ancient  life.  Goethe  evinces  this  tendency  in  his 
"Iphigenie"  and  "Tasso"  and  Schiller  also  in  his  "Braut  von  Messina." 

The  Germans,  emotional  and  imaginative  as  they  are,  were  not  con- 
tent with  the  lack  of  these  traits  in  the  classic  art  and  literature  and 
sought  relief.  The  outcome  was  the  Romantic  School,  opposed  to  the 
art  formalism  of  Winckelmann  and  Lessing  and  to  the  classicism 
in  Goethe  and  Schiller.  The  new  school  was  marked  by  the  enthusiasm 
of  its  founders.  The  fundamental  idea  was  the  reconciliation  of 
poetry  and  philosophy. 

Romanticism  despised  prosaic  utility  and  sought  to  find  artistic 
expression.  Classicism  had  been  characterized  by  complacency  and 
quietude ;  objectivity  and  a  satisfaction  in  Nature  ;  Romanticism  empha- 

i   Winckelmann  Werke,  lib.  4  cap.  2   §  23. 

2  Cf.    Erziehung   d.   mensch.    Geschlechts,   trans,   by   Robertson. 


i8 

sized  first  of  all  subjectivity,  evinced  by  the  writer's  aspiration  and 
vague  longing.  Paulsen  says,  "The  Greek  ideal  of  life,  revived,  is  an 
aesthetical,  rather  than  practical  ideal.  Not  general  utility  but  the  per- 
fection and  manifestation  of  the  personality  is  the  function  of  the  free 
man.  This  view  reached  its  climax  in  Romanticism.  Its  program  was 
to  despise  utility  and  prose,  to  worship  the  individual  and  poetry,  in 
literature  and  in  life."1  The  movement,  in  the  second  place,  portrayed 
a  love  of  the  picturesque  and  strange  mystery.  Tieck,  called  the 
"Pioneer  of  Romanticism,"  thrills  the  reader  with  his  fantastic  legends 
and  "Marchen"  and  in 

"Mondbeglanzte  Zaubernacht, 
Die  den  Sinn  gefangen  halt, 
Wundervolle  Marchenwelt, 
Steig'  auf  in  der  alten  Pracht"2, 

he  voices  the  motto  of  the  School.  Lastly  we  discern  a  reactionary 
spirit  against  materialism,  a  retroactive  spirit  against  classicism,  and 
an  attempt  to  revivify  mediaevalism.  Wackenroder  revived  enthusiasm 
over  Christian  art  by  his  Madonna-worship,  extravagant  but  sincere. 

Schlegel  in  the  "Athenaeum"  declares  that  "Die  franzbsische  Revo- 
lution, Fichte's  Wissenschaftslehre,  und  Goethe's  Meister  sind  die 
grossten  Tendenzen  des  Zeitalters"s  and  according  to  Novalis,  these 
great  influences  philosophical,  political  and  poetical  were  brought  to 
bear  in  the  development  of  the  Romantic  School.  Kant  and  Fichte  con- 
tributed much  to  the  new  era  through  their  philosophy. 

( a  ) .    Philosophical. 

Kant,  in  the  "Critique  of  Judgment,"  creates  an  epoch  in  aesthetics. 
He  appears  as  a  mediator  between  the  sensationalism  of  the  English 
Burke,  and  the  rationalism  of  the  German  Baumgarten.  The  former 
defines  the  beautiful  as  "that  which  pleases"  and  the  latter  declares  it  to 
be  "perfection  apprehended  through  the  senses  by  the  intellect."  Kant 
makes  aesthetics  an  independent  science;  to  judge  whether  a  thing 
is  beautiful,  or  no,  requires  taste,  and  the  judgment  of  taste  is  aesthet- 
ical; it  is  a  subjective  feeling.  We  must  examine  our  own  impres- 
sions, and  impartially  survey  the  object  without  interest.4  Anything 
that  pleases  our  senses  arouses  inclination  and  a  desire  for  satisfaction, 
and  the  person  whose  interest  has  been  aroused  and  who  then  enjoys 

i   Paulsen's    Ethics. 

2  Tieck    Schriften     (1828) — Bd.    I.    s.    36.      Prolog    to    K.    Octavianus. 

3  Fr.    Schlegel   Prosaische   Jugendschriften,    ed.    J.    Minor    (Wien    1906),    Band   II.    Ath. 
§    216. 

4  Critique  of  Judgment,  trans,  by  J.  H.  Bernard,  p.   55  et  seq. 


19 

dispenses  with  judgment.  The  pleasant  pleases  immediately.  A  good 
or  useful  object  may  be  pleasing  but  the  idea  of  its  purpose  must  bring 
the  pleasure  of  the  senses  under  the  principle  of  reason  to  call  it 
good.  We  feel  an  interest  in  its  use  or  goodness ;  and  satisfaction  in 
the  good  presupposes  the  reason  of  its  goodness.  It  is  desire  deter- 
mined by  reason.  The  pleasant  and  the  good  relate  to  desire,  seeking 
satisfaction. 

The  judgment  of  taste  is  contemplative;  it  is  disinterested  and  free. 
All  interest  presupposes  a  desire ;  we  satisfy  our  inclinations,  as  hunger 
and  thirst;  we  obey  and  respect  the  moral  law,  the  categorical 
imperative,  but  taste  differs  from  these.  "It  only  plays  with  the  objects 
of  satisfaction."1  The  beautiful  is,  therefore,  that  which  pleases  with- 
out interest.  This  applies  to  all  men,  and  is  of  universal  validity.  It 
is  not  founded  on  concepts,  as  are  logical  judgments,  but  is  purely 
subjective.  The  pleasant  is  pleasing  to  each  one  as  each  one  has  his 
own  taste ;  the  beautiful  is  not  beautiful  for  one,  but  is  beautiful  if  all 
agree  with  him.  Taste  may  apply  to  the  pleasant  but  only  in  the  latter 
case  is  it  universal.  The  good  depends  on  concepts  of  the  good  which 
are  universal ;  the  beautiful  is  like  the  good,  universal  but  without  a 
concept.  "The  beautiful,  therefore,  is  that  which  pleases  universally, 
without  requiring  a  concept."2  Such  universality  is  subjective  ;  in  judg- 
ments of  taste  the  faculties  of  the  imagination  and  the  understanding 
have  free  play.  Pleasure  follows  the  judgment  and  we  impute  our 
pleasure  to  someone  else.  The  subjective  element  consists  in  the 
more  lively  play  of  both  these  mental  powers  animated  by  mutual  agree- 
ment.3 This  subjectivity  and  "free  play"  of  the  imagination  are  the 
great  influences  on  Romanticism. 

Kant  makes  judgments  of  pleasure  empirical;  those  of  morality  a 
priori,  while  those  of  beauty  rest  on  a  priori  principles,  but  are  synthetic 
and  of  subjective  validity.  Beauty  is  caused  by  the  free  play  of  the 
cognitive  faculties,  receiving  a  regular  play  of  impressions,  and  is 
evinced  in  either  figure  or  play.  In  pantomime,  and  dancing,  it  is  the 
play  of  figures,  in  tune,  the  play  of  sensations.  "The  judgment  is  called 
sesthetical,  because  it  depends  on  the  feeling  of  harmony  in  the  play 
of  the  mental  powers."* 

A  product  of  art  is  caused  by  a  free  play  of  the  representative 
powers5  and  is  not  necessarily  regular  and  symmetrical.  Art  differs 
from  handicraft  because  the  first  is  free,  regarded  as  play,  i.  e.,  an 
occupation  that  is  pleasant  in  itself.     The  best  art  is  produced  where 

i  Ibid.  p.  55.  4  Ibid.  p.  80. 

2  Ibid.  p.  67.  5  Ibid.  p.  98. 

3  Ibid.  p.  64;  cf.  71,  93. 


20 

all  constraint  is  removed,  and  thus  from  work,  it  is  changed  to  "mere 
play."1 

Kant  divides  beautiful  arts  into  arts  of  speech,  formative  arts, 
and  the  arts  of  the  "play"  of  sensations.  Arts  of  speech  are  rhetoric 
and  poetry;  the  orator  gives  us  an  entertaining  "play"  of  the  imag- 
ination, while  the  poet  announces  a  "mere  play"  with  ideas.2  The 
formative  arts  are  sculpture,  architecture  and  painting;  these  furnish 
entertainment  of  the  imagination  in  free  play  with  ideas  and  the  sesthet- 
ical  judgment,  is  merely  a  play,  without  purpose.  The  arts  of  the 
"play"  of  sensations,  produced  externally,  are  music  and  color.  "Music 
is  the  beautiful  play  of  sensations,  or  a  play  of  pleasant  sensations."3 
Kant  places  music  last  of  the  arts  as  it  only  plays  with  sensations. 
Rhetoric  and  poetry,  although  a  play,  carry  on  a  serious  business.4 
Further  free  play  of  sensations  is  evinced  in  play  of  fortune  (games 
of  chance),  play  of  tones  (music)  and  the  play  of  thought  (wit)5; 
the  first  arouse  interest,  and  are  not  beautiful ;  the  second  changes 
from  bodily  sensations  to  sesthetical  ideas ;  the  third  shows  an 
animated  mind,  without  interest.  Jokes  begin  with  the  thoughts  which 
occupy  the  body  and  pass  to  sesthetical  ideas.6 

Kant  contributed  the  ideas  of  subjectivity  and  "free  play"  to  the 
Romanticists.  In  his  "Critique  of  Pure  Reason"  he  likewise  uses  the 
word  "play;"  if  in  our  thought  we  have  subjective  perception  of  an 
object,  but  no  objective  equivalent,  we  should  have  a  "mere  play  of  re- 
presentations, unconnected  with  any  object."7  Our  concepts  are  empty; 
"we  have  thought  in  them,  but  have  not  arrived  at  any  knowledge.  We 
have  only  "played"  with  representations."8  With  Kant,  all  things  con- 
verge to  the  synthetic  unity  of  apperception,  the  conscious  "I."  So  in 
his  aesthetics,  all  is  subjective,  all  is  of  the  "I." 

Fichte  follows  Kant  with  a  philosophy,  the  basis  of  which  is  "Das 
Ich."  As  seen  in  the  "Wissenschaftslehre,"  the  "Ich"  posits  itself,  and 
also  an  opposing  object,  the  world,  or  "Nicht-Ich ;"  this  latter  forms 
an  obstacle,  which  being  overcome,  develops  the  character  of  the  "Ich." 
It  exists  only  for  an  ethical  purpose,  to  develop  character.  There  are 
then  two  facts,  "Das  Ich"  and  its  ethical  self-activity  {Die  That- 
handlung.) 

Romantic  writings  were  sentimental,  artistic  and  emotional.  Fichte 
was  ethical ;  how  does  the  ethical  Fichte  relate  to  the  sesthetical  Roman- 
ticism? The  Romanticists  accepted  the  concept  of  "Das  Ich,"  as  the 
basis  of  their  art.    The  principal  elements  for  them  were  subjectivity 

i  Ibid.  p.  185.  5   Ibid.   p.   221. 

2  Ibid.  p.  207,  208.  6  Ibid.  p.  222,  223. 

3  Ibid.  p.  212,  213,  218.  7  Critique   of  Pure   Reason,    p.    159. 

4  Ibid.  p.  219.  8  Ibid.  p.   127. 


; 


21 

and  originality.  It  is  true,  they  introduced  the  picturesque  background 
of  the  Middle  Ages,  but  the  main  thought  sprang  from  the  Self.  The 
result,  oftentimes,  seemed  odd  and  eccentric,  due  to  marvelous  creations 
of  the  imagination.  The  Self  created  ideals,  to  which  it  could  never 
attain;  the  struggle  was  vain,  the  Self  could  not  reach  the. goal. 

The  second  connecting  link,  we  find  to  be  the  idea  of  Culture. 
Fichte's  extreme  moralism  did  not  exclude  an  idea  which  was  central 
to  Romanticism;  it  was  the  idea  of  Culture.  The  ethical  with  Fichte 
included  both  poetry  and  politics,  because  his  conception  of  morality 
was  broad. 

In  his  "Beitrage  zur  Berichtigung  der  Urtheile  iiber  die  franzosische 
Revolution,"  he  uses  the  word  "Culture"  many  times.  It  is  the  first 
marked  use  of  the  word  found  in  philosophy1  although  Kant  uses  it  in 
his  "Critique  of  Pure  Reason,"  "culture,  which  is  intended  to  form 
a  certain  kind  of  skill,  without  destroying  another  kind  which  is  already 
present"2  and  "Metaphysics  is  the  completion  of  the  whole  culture  of 
human  reason."3 

The  French  Revolution  had  been  a  struggle  for  political  freedom. 
Rousseau's  works  cried  out  for  freedom,  through  a  complete  return  to 
nature.  The  French  took  up  this  idea  of  the  rule  of  the  individual,  and 
how  did  it  culminate?  By  bloodshed  and  a  Reign  of  Terror.  Fichte 
finds  it  necessary  to  follow  a  very  different  path  to  attain  freedom.4 
It  is  by  means  of  Culture. 

None  of  our  own  impulses  have  any  value,  except  in  so  far  as  they 
affect  our  Culture  ("Nichts  in  der  Sinnenwelt,  nichts  von  unserem 
Treiben,  Thun  oder  Leiden,  hat  einen  Werth,  als  insofern  es  auf  Cultur 
wirkt").5  In  attempting  the  freedom  of  "Das  Ich,"  the  first  act  is 
the  "Bezahmung  der  Sinnlichkeit ;"  the  second  is  the  "Cultur  der 
Sinnlichkeit."  "Culture  is  the  exercise  (  Uebung)  of  all  of  our  powers 
(Kraft e)  toward  the  goal  of  complete  freedom  (Zweck  der  volligen 
Freiheit)  ;  of  complete  independence  of  all  which  is  not  pure  Self 
(reines  Selbst)."*  This  Culture  arises  through  and  from  the  self-activity 
of  "Das  Ich;"  it  depends  on  the  use  of  freedom  and  affects  freedom. 
Fichte  refers  to  the  French  Revolution  as  a  means  of  Culture,  "Der 
Krieg  cultivirt;"7  by  means  of  war  strong  souls  are  roused  to  heroic 
feelings  and  deeds;  weak  souls  become  coarse  and  oppressive.  Also, 
"der  hdrteste  Despotismus  cultivirt;"*  the  slave  hears  in  the  death 

i  Eucken — Modern    Phil.    Concepts,    trans,  by    M.    S.    Phelps — p.    216. 

2  Critique  of  Pure  Reason — trans.   Max  Miiller,  p.    570    [710]. 

3  Critique  of  Pure  Reason — trans.   Max  Mtiller,  p.   682    [851]. 

4  Ueber  die  fr.  Rev. — ;  Sammtliche   Werke,  Bd.    VI.   s.   ft. 

5  Ibid.  s.  86.  7  Ibid.  s.  90,  91. 

6  Ibid.  s.  86.  8  Ibid.  s.  91.  | 


22 

sentence  the  promise  of  an  everlasting"  freedom  and  peace.  But  these 
means  of  culture  should  not  be  employed. 

Fichte  asks  what  was  the  goal  in  the  founding  and  government  of 
the  country?  The  answer  gives  two  aims;  (a) Alleinherrschaft  eures 
Willen  im  Innern  and  (b)  Verbreitung  eurer  Grenzen  von  Aussen.  He 
accepts  the  first  as  a  means  to  the  highest  aim,  Cultur  zur  Freiheit; 
and  compares  the  second  with  this  final  aim  and  finds  it  cannot  injure 
Culture,  whether  few  or  many  thousands  will  be  affected.1  He  speaks 
of  three  kinds  of  freedom;  transcendental,  the  same  in  all  rational 
beings;  cosmological,  only  possessed  by  the  Eternal,  but  aimed  at  by 
all  mortals,  to  be  dependent  on  naught  outside  Self ;  political,  or  the 
right  to  acknowledge  no  law  except  what  man  gives  himself.  This 
should  be  in  every  state;  "Cultur  der  Freiheit  soil  der  einzige  End- 
zweck  der  Stoat s-verbindung  sein."2  Society  (Gesellschaft)  and  state 
differ  but  neither  can  give  Culture;  but  C(Beider  Einfluss  auf  unsere 
Cultur  verhdlt  sich  wie  ihr  beiderseitigen  Gebiet."3  One  who  receives 
Culture  from  the  state  will  not  turn  it  against  the  state;  but  man 
must  work  for  the  highest  goal  of  all  "moralischen  IVesen"  through 
Culture.  Man  has  a  right  and  it  is  his  duty  to  seek  means  of  Culture ; 
Culture  is  mine,  as  my  property  is  and  does  not  belong  to  the  state. 

As  his  second  definition  of  Culture,  Fichte  gives  "the  restraining 
and  rooting  out  of  our  own  erring  inclinations  (fehlerhaften  Nei gun- 
gen),  which  oppose  the  awakening  of  reason  (Erwacken  unserer 
Vernunft)  and  the  feeling  of  our  own  self-activity  (Gefilhl  unserer 
Selbstthdtigkeit)  ;  and  also  the  modifying  of  external  things  and 
changing  them  according  to  our  concepts.  (B  e griff  e)"*.  Culture 
is  capable  of  great  variety,  but  differs  only  in  degree.  Culture  is 
the  highest  means  by  which  man  can  reach  self-harmony  (Ueber- 
einstimmung  mit  sich  selbst)  ;  it  is  the  means  of  moral  perfection ; 
"Die  Sinnlichkeit  soil  cultivirt  werden."5 

Fichte's  aim  is  the  spreading  of  Culture  and  the  elevation  of 
humanity.6  He  carries  it  into  politics  where  "culture  creates  the  politi- 
cal aim."7  It  is  possible  to  obtain  political  freedom  and  he  voices  it 
in  "The  true  Fatherland  is  that  state  which  is  most  highly  cultured."8 
This  idea  of  Culture  was  used  by  Fichte  in  an  ethical  sense,  even  in 
politics;  it  was  the  restraint  of  impulse  and  it  aimed  for  absolute 
freedom  of  Self  and  state.  The  Romanticists  put  an  sesthetical  cast 
on  the  idea  of  "Cultur" ;  they  aimed  to  revive  the  study  of  the  Middle 

i  Ibid.    s.    92.  5  Ibid.  s.  298,  299. 

2  Band    VI.    s.  101.  6  Ibid.  s.  301. 

3  Ibid.  s.   139.  7  Band  VII.  s.   146. 

4  Ibid.  s.  298.  8  Band  VII.  s.  212. 


23 

Ages,  but  they  are  closely  related  to  Fichte  through  the  concepts  of 
the  "Ich"  and  "Cultur"  the  latter  being  the  free  activity  of  the 
former. 

(b)  Political. 

The  political  influence  on  Romanticism  was  derived  from  the 
French  Revolution.  A  return  to  nature,  where  absolute  freedom 
would  be  enjoyed,  was  advocated  by  Rousseau.  In  a  state  of  nature, 
we  would  find  primitive  man,  not  in  a  state  of  peace,  but  in  war 
("Bellum  omnium  contra  omnes),  says  Hobbes,  the  English  thinker, 
and  what  was  the  result  with  civilized  man?  A  Revolution,  whereby 
freedom  was  not  won.  In  this  period,  however,  the  ideas  of  egoism 
and  freedom  of  the  Ego  were  paramount  and  these  were  to  exert  a 
great  influence  on  the  Romantic  School.  Kant,  with  his  subjectivity 
and  free  play  in  aesthetics;  Fichte,  with  the  subject  and  its  free 
activity,  expressed  as  Culture,  in  ethics  and  politics,  and  the  French 
Revolution  with  its  egoism  and  freedom,  all  powerfully  influenced 
the  enthusiasts  of  Romanticism. 

(c)  Poetical. 

From  the  realm  of  poetic  art.  we  choose  Goethe  and  Schiller  as 
influencing  the  School.  With  Goethe  and  his  "Wilhelm  Meister,"  the 
influence  is  a  negative  one;  the  book  tells  of  the  desire  of  a  youth 
to  attain  happiness.  His  egoistic  attempts  were  void  of  the  desired 
result,  and  it  is  not  until  he  serves  his  fellowmen  that  happiness  comes 
to  him.  It  portrays  a  growth  from  egoism  to  altruism ;  it  also  pur- 
posed to  show  the  breaking  up  of  a  feudal  system  into  an  industrial 
society.  A  man,  Goethe  believed,  should  be  ranked  according  to  his 
utility.  In  "Faust,"  the  same  doctrine  is  put  forth.  It  is  based  on 
the  Fichtean  activity  (Thathandlung)  :  "Im  Anfang  war  die  That"1 
and  "Die  That  ist  alles,  nichts  der  Ruhm"2  The  egoistic  sensual 
pleasures,  then  those  of  self-culture  and  self-fame  are  in  vain,  and 
only  when  "Faust"  drains  the  large  morass  and  secures  health  and 
happiness  for  posterity,  can  he  say  "Verweile  doch,  du  bist  so  schon!"* 
In  the  "Leiden  des  jungen  Werthers,"  the  letters  teem  with  the  cry 
for  happiness,  but  the  egoistic  longing  for  self-satisfaction  ends  in 
suicide. 

The  Romanticists  deemed  these  works  lacking  in  art  and  imagina- 
tion and  opposed  Goethe  with  tales  of  idealism  and  imagination.  They 
despised  utility  in  all,  but  more  especially  in  tales.     Goethe  exerted  a 

i   Faust — Thomas     ed. — Bk.  I.     1.      1237. 

2  Faust — Thomas    ed. — Ek.     II.    1.     10188. 

3  Ibid.  Vol.  II.  line  11582. 


24 

positive  influence,  however,  by  his  portrayal  of  freedom  from  moral 
restraints  and  his  great  emphasis  on  the  individual  and  his  activity. 

Schiller  follows  Kant  in  his  idea  of  play  in  aesthetics.  Where 
Kant  places  the  judgment  of  taste  between  the  judgments  of  sense  and 
of  the  good,  Schiller  places  "beauty"  between  sense  and  morality. 
Schiller  gives  evidence  of  the  influence  of  idealistic  moralism  from 
Kant,  the  great  "Konigsberger,"  and  a  lower  realism  from  Goethe, 
"der  grosse  Heidner." 

In  his  "Briefe,"  he  opposes  two  natures  in  man,  and  attempts  to 
prove  this  by  metaphysical,  psychological,  ethical  and  aesthetical  dis- 
tinctions. We  study  the  Ego,  and  distinguish  something  permanent, 
and  something  that  changes ;  the  first  we  call  the  person,  the  second, 
his  condition.  The  person  is  permanent,  a  law  in  itself,  whereas  con- 
ditions change ;  but  in  all  our  conditions ;  moods,  feelings,  thought? 
and  acts  we  are  the  same  person ;  these  conditions  do  not  arise  from 
the  person,  and  the  path  to  unite  person  and  condition  would  never 
find  its  goal.1 

The  permanent  personality  is  enclosed  in  reason  and  reflection;  the 
changing  is  due  to  sense-perception.  These  may  be  called  impulses, 
the  one.  relating  to  reason,  the  form-impulse  (Formtriebe),  and  the 
other,  relating  to  sense,  the  sensuous-impulse  (sinnliches  Triebes).2 
The  sensuous-impulse  relates  to  man's  physical  being  and  puts  him  in 
contact  with  matter;  it  is  due  to  perception  and  demands  continued 
change.  The  form-impulse  relates  to  man's  rational  nature,  and 
creates  eternal  laws  and  brings  harmony  into  various  conditions.3  The 
sense-impulse  arouses  inclination  for  the  present  need ;  the  form- 
impulse  shows  man  his  eternal  unchangeable  duty  for  dignity  of  life 
(Erhaltung  des  Lebens)  and  maintenance  of  character  (Bewahrung 
der  Wurde).* 

These  two  impulses  are  to  be  reconciled,  but  how  ?  Kant  says  there 
can  be  no  other  influence  save  duty  in  living  the  categorical  impera- 
tive. Goethe  in  the  "Confessions  of  a  Fair  Saint"5  does  not  unite 
inclination  and  reason,  but  shows  the  victory  of  reason  over  impulse. 
"My  longing  after  the  Invisible  .  .  .  is  an  impulse  that  leads  me 
and  guides  me  aright.     I  freely  follow,  knowing  little  of  restraint."6 

Schiller  places  the  "Spiel-trieb"  or  "play-impulse"  between  the  two 
which  shall  raise  man  to  perfection,  and  set  man  free  physically  and 

i   "Ueber  die  aesthetische   Erziehung  des  Menschen";   Brief   n. 

2  Brief    12. 

3  Briefe  t?,  13. 

4  s.   390,  Werke   (Hempel). 

5  Wilhelm  Meister,  trans,  by  Carlyle,  Bk.  VI.  Vol.  I.,   p.   340  et  seq. 

6  p.  397- 


25 

morally.1  This  is  the  consummation  of  humanity.  The  object  of  sen- 
suous-impulse is  life  (Leben),  and  that  of  the  form-impulse  is  form 
(Gestalt)  ;  the  object  of  the  "Spieltrieb"  is  beauty,  or  living  form.  The 
ancient  statue  is  all  self-satisfied  form,  but  lacks  life.  Beauty  must 
unite  and  balance  reality  and  form;  it  must  lead  the  sensuous  man  to 
form  and  perfection,  and  must  lead  the  too  spiritual  man  to  matter. 
From  the  physical  to  the  moral,  we  are  led  by  the  sesthetical.  "Das 
Spieltrieb"  is  then  a  struggle  in  the  soul  of  the  artist  to  unite  sense 
and  reason.  It  is  art.  "Man  is  only  entirely  a  man  when  he  plays. 
Man  shall  only  play  with  beauty,  and  shall  play  only  with  beauty"2  {der 
Mensch  soil  mit  der  Schonheit  nur  spielen,  und  er  soil  nur  mit  der 
Schonheit  spielen.")  The  genius  is  he  who  unites  perfection  of  art 
and  conduct. 

With  Fichte,  the  activity  of  the  Ego  was  ethical,  with  Schiller 
sesthetical.  With  Kant  and  Schiller,  beauty  or  art  is  only  a  "play" 
between  sense  and  duty.  Herbert  Spencer  speaks  of  a  "play  activity," 
but  his  is  biological ;  it  is  merely  surplus  of  vigor,  ideal  excitement  such 
as  is  seen  in  the  play  of  kittens,  and  heard  in  the  song  of  the  birds. 
The  savage,  after  the  hunt,  carves  his  implements  of  war  and  the 
chase  because  he  possesses  extra  activity  and  it  expresses  itself  in  crude 
attempts  at  art.  Art  with  Spencer  is  "play  activity,"  or  surplus  vigor ; 
with  Schiller  is  a  "play"  with  beauty,  a  means  of  passing  from  the 
sensuous  to  the  moral.3  There  are  three  epochs  in  man's  development ; 
man  in  his  physical  state  endures  only  forces  of  nature ;  he  frees  him- 
self in  the  aesthetical  condition,  and  governs  them  in  the  moral  state. 

When  Schiller  discusses  poetry,  he  makes  similar  distinctions. 
Poetry  may  ie  naive  or  sentimental.  As  a  child  in  its  simplicity  needs 
no  art  to  make  it  great,  so  simplicity  in  nature  triumphs  over  art;  if 
unconsciously,  it  is  "simplicity  as  surprise"  (U  eberraschung)  ;  if  con- 
sciously, it  is  "simplicity  of  feeling"  (Gesinnung).4  The  child  seems  an 
ideal,  and  as  we  realize  what  we  are  not,  sadness  is  aroused,  and  we 
strive  for  this  that  we  are  not  and  this  is  sentimentality.  "Genius  is 
simple,  or  it  is  not  genius"  (Naiv  muss  jedes  wahre  Genie  sein,  oder 
es  ist  keines)."5  It  must  be  guided  by  nature  and  instinct,  not  by  laws. 
Nature  is  as  it  should  be,  but  we  have  become  free  and  have  fled  from 
nature ;  we  regret  this  and  long  to  get  back ;  we  long  for  happiness  and 
for  the  perfection  we  should  find  there.  The  ancient  Greeks  felt  nat- 
urally, so  there  is  no  sadness  there ;  their  life,  even  their  religion  was 
founded  on  simple  nature;  the  moderns  have  lost  nature,  except  in 

i   Briefe    14,    15,   16.  3   Brief  24. 

2  Schiller  Werke   (Berlin — Hempel) — (15)  4  Werke — s.  474   (Hempelausgabe). 

s.    392.  5   Ibid.   s.   479- 


26 

childhood,  and  are  discontented  with  humanity  and  strive  to  find  their 
lost  happiness. 

"The  poet  is  the  guardian  of  nature  (Bewahrer  der  Natur)" -,1 
he  either  expresses  nature,  or  seeks  it.  Therefore  we  have  two  kinds 
of  poetry,  naive  or  simple,  and  sentimental.  Schiller  calls  Homer  and 
Shakespeare,  naive  poets,  lost  in  nature  and  we  forget  the  poet  in  his 
subject.  Goethe  in  "Werther"  evinces  this  same  naive  love  of  nature.2 
The  sentimental  poet  seeks  nature.  The  naive  poet  imitates  the  real, 
as  he  sees  it ;  the  modern  poet  represents  an  ideal  as  for  him  the  real 
does  not  exist.  Ideal  humanity  will  unite  these  views ;  "Natur  macht 
ihn  mit  sick  eins,  die  Kunst  trennt  und  entzweit  ihn,  durch  das  Ideal 
kehrt  er  zur  Einheit  zuriick."s 

.  The  simple  poet  imitates  the  real,  and  is  content;  the  sentimental 
poet  reflects  on  nature  and  expresses  the  real  and  ideal.  Which  will 
predominate?  In  satirical  poetry,  the  real  is  contrasted  with  the  ideal 
showing  the  distance  things  are  from  nature.  It  may  be  humorous  or 
pathetic  satire.  In  elegaic  poetry,  either  nature  or  the  ideal  are  objects 
of  sadness,  as  lost  to  man,  or  both  are  objects  of  joy„  being  represented 
as  reality;  the  first  is  elegy,  the  second,  the  idyl.  Rousseau  is  an 
elegaic  poet  seeking  nature ;  Klopstock  and  Kleist  are  others  who  seek 
the  ideal.  Goethe's  "Werther"  expresses  the  sentimental  longing  also  in 
"Alas,  when  we  have  attained  our  object,  we  are  as  poor  as  ever,  and 
our  souls  still  languish  for  unattainable  happiness."4  "The  idyl  pre- 
sents the  idea  of  an  innocent  and  happy  humanity;  man  in  a  state  of 
innocence;  it  is  humanity  reconciled  with  itself;  it  is  union  of  inclina- 
tion and  duty  (Vereinigung  der  Neigungen  mit  dem  Gesetze  einer 
zur  hochsten  sittlichen  Wilrde)  ;  it  is  the  ideal  of  beauty  applied  to  real 
life  (Ideal  der  Schonheit  auf  das  wirkliche  Leben  angewendet)  ."5 

It  reconciles  the  real  and  the  ideal. 

The  simple  poet  is  limited  by  sensuous  reality;  whereas  the  senti- 
mental poet  has  absolute  unconditional  freedom.  The  first  accomplishes 
his  object,  but  is  limited;  the  second  does  not  attain  his  goal,  but 
has  an  unlimited  goal.  The  simple  poet  needs  help  from  without, 
whereas  the  sentimental  poet  is  his  own  genius.  The  simple  poet  is 
in  danger  of  acquiring  vulgar  habits  of  style  and  expression;  the 
sentimental  poet  may  remove  all  limits,  nullify  human  nature,  rise 
beyond  the  finite  and  reality  and  become  a  dreamer;  freed  from  all 
law,  he  loses  himself  in  fantasy;  he  may  exaggerate  and  become 
extravagant. 

i   Ibid.   s.  487.  3   Werke — Schiller — (15)   s.  493. 

2  Letters     May     26,    June    21,     Aug     28;  4  Letter  June  21. 

May    9,    Sept.    4.  5  Werke — Schiller  s.   527. 


27 

The  simple  poet  must  not  sink  too  low,  nor  the  sentimental  poet 
dream  too  high.  Harmony  must  prevail  and  a  union  of  simple  and 
sentimental  will  attain  a  "beautiful  humanity"  as  beauty  results  from 
the  harmony  of  spirit  and  sense.  The  consummation  of  humanity  is 
where  the  "Spieltrieb"  raises  man  to  perfection  from  physical  to 
moral  freedom,  and  where  the  naive  poet  uses  sentimental  material  in 
his  art. 

The  struggle  of  the  artist  to  unite  the  real  with  the  ideal  forms 
the  basis  of  all  the  philosophy  of  Romanticism,  with  Friedrich 
Schlegel  as  the  founder. 

III.     Schlegel's  "Ironie." 
i.   Influence  of  Schiller. 

In  Friedrich  Schlegel  is  found  a  synthesis  of  Fichte,  Goethe  and 
Schiller.  The  dualism  of  Kant,  his  noumenon  and  phenomenon,  ana 
that  of  Fichte,  the  Ego  and  Non-ego,  formed  a  problem  for  Schlegel. 
Schiller  had  attempted  to  combine  permanence  and  becoming,  duty  and 
sense  by  means  of  the  "Spieltrieb/'  making  "play"  the  mediator  between 
the  spiritual  and  sensuous  sides  of  man ;  thus  it  is  that  man  only  plays 
in  art  and  that  the  poet  is  tht  true  man. 

Schiller's  contrast  between  naive  and  sentimental  poetry  was 
accepted  by  Schlegel,  but  in  "Die  Griechen  und  Romer"  he  renames 
and  remodels  the  distinction.  As  we  have  seen,  the  naive  poet  is  lost 
in  his  portrayal  of  nature ;  the  sentimental  bard  evinces  the  search  for 
nature,  as  a  lost  paradise,  and  sets  forth  the  gulf  between  the  real  and 
the  ideal ;  real  art  will  unite ;  the  naive  poet  using  sentimental  material. 

With  Schlegel,  sentimental  poetry  represents  the  "return  to  lost 
nature"  (die  Riickkehr  zur  verlohrnen  Natur),1  but  he  adds  that  not 
every  expression  of  strife  toward  the  infinite  (Streben  nach  dem 
Unendlichen)  is  sentimental,  nor  is  every  portrayal  of  the  absolute 
(Darstellung  des  Absoluten)2 ;  the  real  characteristics  of  the  senti- 
mental poetry  are,  "interest  in  the  reality  of  an  ideal  (Inter esse  an  der 
Realitdt  des  Ideals),  reflexion  over  the  relation  of  the  ideal  and  real, 
and  the  relation  of  the  idealizing  fancy  of  the  poet  upon  an  individual 
object  (die  Beziehung  auf  ein  individuelles  Objekt  der  idealisirenden 
Embildungskraft  des  dichtenden  Subjekts)."9 

Grecian  poetry  begins  with  nature  and  aims  to  reach  beauty  through 
culture;4  it  is  pure  art  of  the  beautiful  (reine  Kunst  des  Schonen).* 

i   Prosaische    Jugendschriften,    ed.    J.    Minor,    Bd.    I.,   s.    80. 

2  Ibid.  «.    81.  4  Ib»d.    s.    10. 

3  Ibid.    s.    82.  5  Ibid.    s.    38. 


28 

With  modern  poetry,  beauty  is  not  the  ideal ;  it  begins  with  interest, 
or  subjective  sesthetical  power  (das  Inter  esse,  d.  h.  subjektive  cesthet- 
iche  Kraft)1  and  its  goal  either  has  not  been  attained,  or  else  it  has 
no  set  aim,  no  direction,  no  unity. 

Satisfaction  can  only  arise  from  complete  enjoyment,  when  all 
longing  has  ceased;  modern  poetry  expresses  unsatisfied  longing;  the 
moderns  set  aside  beauty  as  an  ideal  and  yet  exhibit  all  the  longing  and 
dissatisfaction  in  striving  for  it  after  all ;  "Je  mehr  man  sich  von  dem 
Schonen  entfernte,  je  heftiger  man  nach  demselben  strebte."2  The 
limits  of  knowledge  and  art  are  confused  and  philosophy  becomes 
poetry,  and  poetry  philosophy.  (Die  Philosophic  poetisirt  und  die 
Poesie  philosophirt.)3  Schlegel  denies  the  distinction  between  poetry 
and  philosophy  and  requires  everyone  to  be  a  true  philosopher,  i.  e.,  a 
poet.  Poetry  demands  absolute  originality  (absolute  Originalitdt)  and 
the  genius  arises,  making  a  disregard  of  law  the  first  principle  of  his 
art ;  his  poetry  based  on  the  interest  of  the  Ego  (interessante  Individu- 
ality) results  in  confusion  (Verwirrung),  lawlessness  (Gesetzlosig- 
keit),  scepticism  (Skeptizmus),  and  want  of  principle  (Characterlo- 
sigkeit)  .* 

Each  genius  strives  after  his  own  ideal  with  unsatisfied  yearning 
(strebt  in  unbefriedigter  Sehnsucht)  ;  this  disregard  of  law  and  lack 
of  uniformity  in  the  ideal  causes  modern  poetry  to  appear  as  "a  sea  of 
striving  forces  (Meer  streitender  Krafte),  a  chaos  of  beauty  (ein 
Chaos  alles  Erhabnen,  Schonen,  Reizenden) ,  an  anarchy."5  Will  such 
an  anarchy  bring  about  a  beneficial  revolution  ? 

Modern  poetry  is  spurred  on  by  the  free  act  (freier  Aktes  des 
Gemiiths)  ;  it  is  "a  restless  unsatisfied  striving  after  the  new,  the  piquant 
and  the  striking  (das  rastlose  unersdttliche  Streben  nach  dem  Neuen, 
Piquanten  und  Frappanten) ,"  but  the  yearning  remains  unsatisfied  (die 
Sehnsucht  bleibt  unbefriedigt)6  Either  freedom  or  nature  gives  man 
the  impulse  for  culture;  in  modern  art,  it  is  the  "free  play  without 
a  set  goal"  (freies  Spiel  ohne  bestimmten  Zweck)  ;  the  fantasy  of  the 
Romantic  School  proves  this. 

Schlegel  mentions  three  classes  of  poets,  whose  goal  may  be  the 
good  (das  Gute),  the  beautiful  (das  Schbne),  or  the  true  (das 
Wahre),1  but  for  him  the  ideal  poetry  is  that  which  has  for  its  goal 
the  philosophical  interest  (das  philosophisch  Interessante).  Accord- 
ingly he  places  Shakespeare  as  the  foremost  of  all  modern  poets, 
whereas  Schiller  had  placed  him,  as  we  have  seen,  among  the  na'ive 

i  Ibid.  s.  79.  5  Ibid.  s.  92. 

2  Ibid.  s.  89.  6  Ibid.  s.  95. 

3  Ibid.  s.  89.  7  Ibid.  s.  103. 

4  Ibid.  s.  91. 


29 

or  simple  poets  j1  he  portrays  for  Schlegel  romantic  fantasy  and  heroic 
greatness  mingled  with  poetical  philosophy. 

In  modern  poetry,  the  highest  aim  is  the  greatest  which  can  be 
demanded  of  art,  toward  which  she  can  strive.  This  unconditioned 
goal  can  never  be  entirely  reached  and  the  genius  will  be  ever  creating 
a  new  goal  through  the  endless  play  of  his  fancy ;  it  can  be  approached 
but  never  reached.  Modern  poetry  will  be  ever  changing ;  as  the  goal 
is  changeable,  so  the  poetry  will  change.  With  a  fixed  objective 
unchangeable  goal,  sesthetical  culture  can  itself  be  fixed,  but  the  sub- 
jective changeable  goal  set  by  the  genius  will  not  allow  of  a  permanent 
style  in  poetry. 

In  this  "aesthetical  revolution,"  two  postulates  are  formulated;  aes- 
thetical  strength  and  morality.  Man  postulates  through  his  freedom 
the  moral  laws.  As  he  wills  the  sesthetical,  so  he  wills  the  moral ;  then, 
as  both  arise  from  himself,  he  will  persist  in  their  furtherance.  A 
proper  taste  can  only  arise  from  a  morally  good  mind.2  This  reminds 
us  of  the  Fichtean  moral  will. 

With  the  Greeks,  beauty  was  the  all ;  nature  surrounded  the  Greek 
poet  completely;  he  is  sunk  in  nature.  Grecian  art  shows  a  tendency 
toward  the  objective;  it  is  classic  as  Grecian  plastic;  "the  complete 
harmony  of  poetic  art  and  nature  poetry  is  found  only  in  the  classic 
poetry"  (die  volkommne  Harmonie  der  Kunstpoesie  und  Naturpoesie 
iindet  sich  nur  in  den  Alten,  in  der  klassischen  Poesie).3  As  all  are 
sons  of  nature,  fate  (Schicksal)  plays  a  great  part  in  Greek  poetry 
and  drama.  Beauty  is  a  gift  from  nature  and  to  the  ideal  of  "free 
beauty,"  the  Grecian  poetry  attained;  "a  golden  age,  enjoyment  com- 
plete and  self-satisfying  (Genuss  vollstandig  und  selbstgenugsam) , 
highest  beauty."4  "Greek  culture  was  original  and  national,  a  com- 
plete whole  (ein  in  sich  vollendetes  Ganses),  which  through  pure  inner 
development  attained  a  high  place  and  then  again  sank  into  itself  after 
a  complete  cycle  (Kreislauf)  ;  so  original  was  also  Greek  poetry."5 
It  is  a  natural  history  of  taste  and  art,  containing  the  simple  and  pure 
elements  into  which  modern  poetry  must  be  analyzed  in  order  to 
unravel  the  chaos.0  Morality  has  no  place  in  Grecian  poetry,  but 
patriotism  attains  a  prominent  position. 

Greek  poetry  starts  with  nature  and  ends  there;  it  was  fostered 
through  worldliness  (Sinnlichkeit)  and  finally  sank  into  lowest  debauch- 
ery (Schwelgerei),  into  the  deepest  degeneracy  (Entartung)  .7     With 

i   Ibid.  s.   107.  S  8.   143- 

2  s.    122.  6  s.   146. 

3  Athenaeum   §  252.  7  s.   151. 

4  Die  Gr.  und  R.,  s.  133. 


30 

the  Romans,  life  also  was  the  full  enjoyment  of  nature,  lawless  and 
unlimited,  and  it  finally  ended  in  complete  dissolution  (Erschlaifung 
und  Auflosung).1 

Modern  poetry  sets  forth  the  strife  of  subjective  disposition  and 
objective  tendency  of  sesthetical  power,  and  the  predominance  of  the 
latter  (den  steten  Streit  der  subjektiven  Anlage  und  der  objektiven 
Tendenz  des  cesthetischen  Vermogens  und  das  allmahlige  Ueberge- 
wicht  des  letztern) ."2  The  understanding  is  constantly  striving  be- 
tween two  opposites ;  from  within,  the  eternal  directions  of  the  striving 
mind  (die  ewigen  Richtungen  des  strebenden  Gemiiths)  ;  from  without, 
the  unalterable  laws  of  nature  (die  unwandelbaren  Gesetze  der 
Natur).s  With  the  Greek,  art  started  with  nature  and  ended  there; 
the  modern  strives  to  find  nature  again.  Many  German  authors  show 
a  desire  to  unite  the  ancient  with  the  modern  such  as  the  chorus 
(Tendenz  zum  Chor)  in  Schiller.4 

Schlegel  places  Goethe's  poetry  as  the  "dawn  of  real  art  and  pure 
beauty"  (die  Morgenrbthe  echter  Kunst  und  reiner  Schonheit)  f  a 
union  of  ancient  and  modern,  between  the  "interesting  and  the  beauti- 
ful" (Interessanten  und  die  Schonen)?  In  "Faust,"  the  hero's  marriage 
with  Helena  of  Troy  is  evidence  of  attempt  to  unite  ancient  with  mod- 
ern, a  pursuit  of  the  beautiful,  a  reconciliation  of  Greek  ideals  with 
northern  art,  but  Helena  vanishes  and  Faust  awakes  to  practical  life ; 
also,  the  awful  face  of  the  Earth  spirit  (schreckliches  Gesicht  des  Erd- 
geistes),  like  the  large  face  of  Jupiter,  is  a  return  to  Greek  life.7 
Schlegel  says  Goethe's  style  is  a  mixture  of  that  of  Homer,  Euripides 
and  Aristophanes,  of  pure  and  simple  aesthetical  elements.8 

Life  to  the  modern  is  an  earnest  strife  (ein  ernster  Kampf)  seeking 
satisfaction.  Man  must  be  free  and  he  forms  from  himself  taste  and 
enjoyment  in  the  beautiful  (Geschmack,  Genuss  des  Schonen).  Love 
is  the  delight  of  the  free  man,  and  the  highest  love  is  the  love  of  coun- 
try. (Liebe  ist  der  Genuss  des  freien  Menschen  und  die  hochste  Liebe 
ist  die  Vaterlandsliebe)  .9  This  reminds  one  of  the  patriotism  of  the 
Greek  and  Roman.  "All  love  is  in  itself  poor  and  its  fullness  is  a 
gift  of  nature ;  pure  nature  is  all  abundance ;  all  harmony  is  a  gift 
of  love.  In  art  fullness  and  harmony  unite.  Both  infinites  (Unendlich- 
keiten)  form  a  new  whole.  Nature  gives  to  taste  extension;  to  love, 
power ;  to  art,  order  and  law.  (Natur  gibt  dem  Geschmack  Umfang, 
die  Liebe  Kraft,  die  Kunst  Ordnung  und  Gesetz.)10 

i   s.  25    (Die  Grenzen  des  Schonen)—  6  Haym's  Rom.   Schule,  s.   189. 

Minor  I.  .  7  Goethe's    Faust — Thomas    ed. — Pt.    I.,    1 

2  s.   171.  483. 

3  s.   21.  8  Die   Gr.   und  Romer — s.    146. 

4  s.    177.  9  s.    23   und  25.      (Grenzen   des   Schonen.) 

5  s.   114.  10  s.  27. 


31 

Schiller  made  naive  and  sentimental  poetry  a  distinction  not  of 
time,  but  of  manner ;  with  Schlegel,  it  is  a  difference  in  the  action,  and 
therefore  historical  (in  der  That,  ein  historischer).1  He  sees  the 
objective  is  the  true  goal  of  the  ancient  and  that  the  only  remedy  for 
the  modern  is  to  cease  being  sentimental,  whereby  he  is  ruled  by  indi- 
vidual interest,  and  return  to  the  classic  style,  that  he  may  become 
Grecian  again.  "Schiller's  standpoint,"  says  Haym,  "was  ideological; 
Schlegel's  was  doctrinal."2 

In  the  "Athenaeum"  the  contrast  is  expressed  in  similar  fashion. 
Schlegel  says  of  the  Greeks  and  Romans  that  they  had  little  genius, 
but  much  ingenuity;  but  antiquity  itself  was  a  kind  of  genius  which 
for  the  modern  is  unattainable.3  A  similar  distinction  is  made  in  the 
"Lyceum,"  where  he  asserts  that  "out  of  that  which  the  moderns  wish, 
one  must  learn  what  poetry  should  be ;  out  of  that  which  the  ancients 
did,  what  it  must  be."4  The  same  work  points  out  how  the  ancients 
were  masters  of  poetical  abstraction,  while  the  moderns  are  more 
given  to  poetical  speculation  ;5  among  the  ancients,  he  further  declares, 
one  sees  the  very  letter  of  poetry  itself,  while  the  modern  has  simply  an 
idea  of  the  poetical  spirit.6  With  his  philosophical  conception  of 
poetry,  Schlegel  urges  that  all  poetry  is  but  a  commentary  upon  the 
texts  of  speculation  and  in  the  same  manner  he  endeavors  to  unite  art 
and  science  by  saying  "all  art  should  become  science  and  all  science, 
art."7  By  such  means,  Schlegel  hopes  to  bring  about  a  unity  of  poetry 
and  philosophy;  "Zur  Harmonie  gelangt  sie  nur  durch  Verbindung 
der  Poesie  und  der  Philosophies8 

The  ancient  with  Schlegel  is  like  the  naive  of  Schiller, — a  poet 
lost  in  nature  and  thus  satisfied ;  the  modern  like  the  sentimental  seeks 
for  a  new  object;  with  endless  play,  the  genius  has  no  Hurts;  he  soars 
above  nature,  setting  his  own  .goal,  which  he  again  destroys  and 
creates  anew.  Perfect  art  would  unite  the  ancient  and  modern ;  would 
unite  poetry  and  philosophy.    Can  such  art  be  realized  ? 

We  have  now  completed  the  survey  of  the  essay  "Die  Griechen  und 
Romer,"  which  sets  forth  the  poetical  influence  of  Schiller  on  Friedrich 
Schlegel.  Thus  it  is  seen  that  ancient  art,  like  naive,  is  calm  and  con- 
tent, but  modern,  like  the  sentimental,  evinces  the  struggle  to  attain 
a  goal,  which  the  genius  creates  and  then  destroys. 

2.    Influence  of  Fichte  and  Goethe. 

We  will  now  examine  the  influence  of  Fichte  on  Schlegel.    Fichte, 

i   Haym's  Rom.  Schule,  s.  205.  5  Lyceum   §    107. 

2  Romantische   Schule,   s.   205.  6  Lyceum  §  93. 

3  Athenaeum   8  248.  7  Lyceum   §    115. 

4  Lyceum   §   84.  8  Athenaeum   §  451. 


32 

in  his  "Theory  of  Morals,"  likens  philosophy  to  poetic  talent.  "Art 
makes  the  transcendental  view  the  common  one,  and  aesthetic  contem- 
plation finds  in  everything,  even  in  the  moral  law,  not  an  absolute 
command  but  itself,  and  hence  it  is  related  to  moral  law  as  a  free 
being,  not  as  a  slave."1 

Schlegel  declares  Fichte's  "Wissenschaftslehre"  to  be  a  philosophy 
of  the  material  of  Kant's  philosophy  (eine  Philosophie  tiber  die  Materie 
der  Kantischen  Philosophie).  One  can  comprehend  the  identity  of  his 
philosophy  with  the  Kantian  (man  kann  die  Identitdt  seiner  Philosophie 
mit  der  Kantischen  sehen  und  begreifen).2  Fichte  believed  reason  and 
freedom  should  rule  the  state ;  in  the  world,  all  was  the  expression  of 
freedom,  the  rule  of  the  individual  (Ausdruck  der  Freiheit,  die  Allein- 
herrschaft  des  Ich),3  and  his  ethical  philosophy  was  the  result  of  his 
politics. 

Schlegel  agreed  with  the  theory  of  the  power  of  the  Ego's  activity, 
but  put  an  sesthetical  aspect  over  the  Fichtean  ethics.  Fichte's  unend- 
ing activity  surpasses  self-imposed  barriers;  Schlegel's  activity  is  the 
fancy  of  the  genius  directed  toward  a  self-imposed  ideal,  far  beyond 
reality.  He  is  powerfully  influenced  by  Fichte,  especially  as  he  finds 
the  modern  Fichte  to  be  as  ethical  as  Plato  and  the  ancients  by  whom 
his  ethical  ideals  has  been  aroused.  Two  impulses  strove  in  Schlegel's 
spirit  for  union;  one  the  calm  contented  beauty  and  harmony  of  the 
ancient  classics;  the  other,  the  subjectivism  of  the  modern  philosophy 
with  its  freedom  and  its  strife  toward  the  unending.  (Die  befriedigte 
Schonheit  und  Harmonie  in  der  Alterthum  und  der  Klassiker;  der 
Subjektivismus  der  modernen  Philosophie  mit  ihrer  Freiheitsbe geist- 
erung  und  ihrem  Streben  nach  dem  Unendlichen).4  How  can  he 
reconcile  them? 

Goethe  in  his  poetry  portrays  the  beautiful  and  harmonious  (das 
Schone  und  Harmonische)  ;  Fichte,  the  striving  ego  (W eltbekdmpf en- 
den  Ich).6  Schlegel,  in  his  aesthetical  and  ethical  doctrine  unites 
Goethe  and  Fichte ;  he  places  the  "Wissenschaftslehre,"  "Wilhelm 
Meister"  with  the  French  Revolution,  as  the  three  greatest  tendencies 
of  the  age,6  and  again  the  Fichtean  idealism  and  Goethe's  poetrv  are 
the  two  centers  of  German  art  and  culture  (die  beiden  Centra  der 
deutschen  Kunst  und  Bildung).1 

In  his  essay,  "Uber  die  Poesie,"  Schlegel  speaks  of  three  charac- 
teristics of  "Wilhelm  Meister,"  whereby  we  learn  of  Goethe's  influ- 
ence on  Schlegel.     The  characteristics  are  first,  individuality  (Individu- 

i   Cf.   Erdmann  Vol.  II.,   §   314;  3.                        5  Haym  s.  249. 

2  Athenaeum    §    281.  6  Athenaeum   §   216. 

3  Haym  s.   218.  7  U.     die     Unverstiindlichkeit — Minor     Bd. 

4  Haym  s.  249.  11.,  s.    389. 


33 

alit'dt),  second,  antique  spirit  under  a  modern  veil  (antike  Geist  unter 
der  modernen  Hulle),  and  third,  a  harmony  of  classic  and  romantic 
(Harmonie  des  Classischen  und  des  Romantischen) .  The  author 
expresses  two  ideas;  that  of  a  romance  (Kunstler-roman) ,  and  the 
education  of  a  life  (Bildungslehre  der  Lebenskunst)  }  As  stated  above, 
Goethe  unites  the  antique  style  with  the  "Ironie"  of  reflection,  the 
ancient  and  the  modern.  The  Romantic  element  of  mystery  is  accorded 
by  Mignon  and  the  Harper,  whose  lyrics  both  entertain  and  give  food 
for  reflection.  Schlegel  declares  the  book  to  be  "an  historical  phil- 
osophy of  art"  (eine  historische  Philosophic  der  Kunst),  "a  work  of 
art,  or  poem"  (ein  Kunstwerk  oder  Gedicht),  "all  poetry,  pure  poetry" 
(alles  Poesie,  reine,  hohe  Poesie.  .  .  .  ),  "this  wonderful  prose 
is  prose  and  yet  poetry.  The  book  has  genius"  (diese  wunderbare 
Prosa  ist  Prosa  und  doch  Poesie.    Das  Buch  hat  Genius)  ? 

Throughout  the  book  is  seen  the  "Ironie,"  which  we  learn  now  is 
a  contrast  between  hope  and  result  (Hoifnung  und  Erfolg),  fancy  and 
reality  {Einbildung  und  Wirklichkeit) ,  reality  and  idealism  (Realitat 
und  Idealitdt).3  Wilhelm's  unending  impulse  for  culture  is  another 
phase  of  "Ironie."  The  book  seems  a  play,  but  it  soon  becomes  serious- 
ness (Es  ist  ein  inter essantes  Spiel  und  wurde  nun  Ernst).41  The 
Romantic  personae  Mignon,  Sperata  and  Augustine  all  pass  away  on 
account  of  the  excess  (Uebermass)  of  their  own  soaring  fancies. 
Schlegel  considers  Goethe  to  have  reached  the  goal  in  art.  "He  who 
has  properly  characterized  Goethe's  Meister  has  truly  said  what  the 
poetry  of  the  age  is."  (Wer  Goethe's  Meister  behorig  charakterisirte, 
der  hatte  damit  wohl  eigentlich  gesagt,  was  es  jetzt  an  der  Zeit  ist  in 
der  Poesie).5  Schlegel  calls  "Wilhelm  Meister"  the  genuine  romance, 
the  sum  of  everything  poetical,  and  he  designates  this  poetical  ideal,  the 
"Romantic  poetry"  (romantische  Dichtung).9  Here  he  changes  the 
term  modern  to  "Romantic"  and  lays  stress  on  the  fact  that  it  does 
not  lack  "Die  Ironie." 

The  ancient  classic  art  expressed  complete  harmony  and  satisfac- 
tion; the  modern,  or  under  its  new  term,  Romantic,  art  expresses 
strife.  "Die  romantische  Dichtung  ist  eine  progressive  Universal- 
poesie  (is  a  progressive  universal  poetry)  ...  a  union  of  poetry 
and  philosophy  .  .  .  it  is  unending,  because  it  alone  is  free  and 
posits  as  its  first  law  that  the  poet  will  suffer  no  law  over  him  (es 
ist  unendlich,  weil  sie  allein  frei  ist  und  das  als  ihr  erstes  Gesetz 

i  Ueber  die  Poesie — Minor  II.,   s.   381.  4  Ibid  s.   182. 

2  Ueber  W.  Meister — Ch.  und  Kr.  Minor  II  s.    171.  5  Lyceum  Minor  II.   §    120. 

3  Ibid  s.   174.  6  Haym  s.  251. 


34 

anerkennt,   dass   die    Willkuhr  des  Dichters   kein   Gesetz   iiber  sich 
leide.1 

We  see  here  the  Fichtean  influence  of  freedom  and  the  Goethean 
expression  of  egoism.  This  is  Schlegel's  "Ironie/'  the  watchword  of 
Romanticism,  as  Novalis  says  "Die  Spadille,  womit  immer  gestochen 
wurde."2 


4.     "DIE   IRONIE." 

The  concept  of  "Ironie"  involves  a  gradual  growth  as  did  Roman- 
tic poetry  itself.  The  first  use  of  "Ironie"  with  Schlegel  was  a  mention 
of  the  "Socratic  irony;  all  jest  and  earnestness;  it  springs  from  the 
union  of  natural  philosophy  and  philosophy  of  art"  {die  Sokratische 
Ironie,  alles  Scherz  und  Ernst;  sie  entspringt  aus  dem  Zusammen- 
treffen  vollendeter  Naturphilosophie  und  vollendeter  Kunstphiloso- 
phie)3  .  .  .  die  Urbanitdt  der  Sokratischen  Muse.*  He  then 
gives  voice  to  a  new  "Ironie,"  a  "Widerstreit  des  Unbedingten  und  des 

Bedingten    .     .     .     sie   ist    die   freieste   alter   Licenzen sie 

ist  Selbstparodie  (a  strife  of  unconditioned  and  conditioned  .  .  . 
it  is  the  freest  of  all  licenses     .     .     .     it  is  a  parody  of  Self).5 

"Ironie"  expresses  the  problematic  dualisms  of  Kant  and  Fichte, 
the  freedom  of  the  Fichtean  Ego  and  the  individuality  of  Goethe's 
hero. 

Schlegel  further  characterizes  "Ironie"  as  finding  its  true  home  in 
philosophy,  and  as  the  means  of  raising  poetry  to  the  heights  of 
philosophy,  and  uniting  them.  He  asserts  that  there  are  many 
poems,  both  old  and  new,  that  breathe  the  air  of  "Ironie."6  "Ironie" 
is  much  in  evidence  in  "Wilhelm  Meister ;"  the  author  seems  to  laugh 
at  his  own  masterpiece  from  a  position  far  above  it.7 

This  is  not  the  "Socratic  irony ;"  it  is  a  transcendental  buffoonery ; 
within,  a  spirit  which  oversees  all  and  ever  elevates  itself  over  all 
conditioned  (im  Innern,  die  Stimmung  welche  alles  ubersieht,  und 
sich  uber  alles  Bedingte  unendlich  erhebt)  ;  without,  in  expression, 
the  mimical  manner  of  a  clown  (im  Aussern,  in  der  Ausfuhrung  die 
mimische  Manier  eines  guten  Buffo).8 

Two  characteristics  of  "Ironie"  are  evident;  first,  strife,  of  an 
unavoidable  incongruity  (Widerstreit,  unvermeidlicher  Unangemes- 
senheit)    and    second,    the    triumphal    elevation    of    the    subject    into 

1  Athenseum    §     116    (Minor  II)  5   Lyceum   §    108. 

2  Ch.    Haym    s.    258.  6  Lyceum   8  42. 

3  Lyceum   §    108.  7  Ueber   W.   Meister — (Minor  II)    s.    171. 

4  Lyceum  §  42.  8  Lyceum  §  42. 


35 

unconditional  freedom  (die  triumphirende  Erhebung  in  die  unbedingte 
Freiheit  des  Subjekts).1  The  first  seems  to  remind  us  of  the  Socratic, 
while  the  second  is  a  recasting  of  the  concept. 

In  the  Fichtean  Ego's  activity  can  be  united  these  two  ideas;  the 
strife  of  the  Ego  and  its  freedom  and  limitation  in  the  ethical  world 
order.  It  is  an  endless  strife,  never  attaining  realization.  The 
"Ironie"  contains  the  same  doctrine,  the  strife  of  the  real  and  ideal 
in  art  and  poetry  is  never  to  be  adjusted.  The  Ego  can  never  reach 
the  ideal  it  posits  in  its  aesthetical  freedom. 

Such  a  doctrine  aroused  what  Schlegel  called  the  "Unverstand- 
lichkeit"  (unintelligibility)  and  he  writes  a  "Fragment"  to  lighten 
the  difficulty.  He  gives  a  system  of  "Die  Ironie"  in  which  he  describes 
various  sorts  of  "Ironie ;"  "die  grobe,  die  delikate  und  die  extra-feine 
Ironie"  (coarse,  delicate  and  extra  fine),  all  used  by  writers  in  ex- 
pressing feigned  friendliness  waiting  for  an  opportunity  to  injure; 
fourth,  "die  redliche  Ironie;"  then,  "die  dramatische  Ironie"  where 
the  dramatist  plans  for  three  acts,  and  then  finds  he  must  add  two 
more ;  "die  doppelte  Ironie"  one  for  Parterre,  the  other  for  die 
ho  gen;  lastly  "Die  Ironie  der  Ironie"  and  this  is  the  most  profound 
(griindlichste)  "Ironie  of  Ironie."2  This  "Ironie"  is  "the  form  of  the 
Paradox.  Paradox  is  all  that  is  great  and  at  the  same  time  good. 
(Paradox  ist  alles  zvas  zugleich  gut  und  gross  ist.)"3  The  romances 
are  the  Socratic  dialogues  of  our  age  (Sokratischen  Dialoge  un- 
serer  Zeit).4 

The  strife  of  real  and  ideal  as  the  basis  of  "Ironie"  may  be  shown 
in  the  meaning  of  an  "Idee": — "Ein  Ideal  ist  Idee.  Eine  Idee  ist 
eine  absolute  Synthesis  absoluter  Antithesen,  der  stete  sich  selbst 
erzeugende  Wechsel  zwei  streitender  Gedanken.  .  .  .  Nichts  ist 
kldglicher  als  die  sentimentale  speculation  ohne  Objekt."6  He  further- 
more brings  in  the  idea  of  change  in  saying  that  "Ironie"  is  an 
everlasting  change  of  self-creation  and  self-destruction,6  and  that  it 
is  "clear  knowledge  of  the  eternal  activity  in  the  unending  chaos."7 

"Ironie"  creates  and  then  destroys  both  "Idee"  and  "Projekt."  A 
project  is  the  subjective  germ  of  an  object  to  be — it  must  be  both  sub- 
jective and  objective; — the  transcendental  is  that  which  has  reference 
to  the  union  or  separation  of  the  ideal  and  the  real  (zuas  auf  die 
Verbindung  oder  Trennung  des  Idealen  und  Realen  Bezug  hat).8 

With  the  subjective   element  now  emphasized  in  the   Schlegelian 

i  Haym  s.  259.  5  Athenaeum  §   121. 

2  Ueber  die  Unverst&ndlichkeit— Minor  II.   s.  392.  6  Athenaeum  §   51. 

3  Lyceum  §48.  7  Ideen  §  69. 

4  Lyceum  §  26.  8  Athenaeum  §  22. 


36 

poetry  and  philosophy,  we  see  a  contradiction  to  his  theory  which  was 
supreme  when  he  wrote,  "Ueber  die  Griechische  Poesie"  and  prayed 
for  a  return  to  it.  There  all  was  objective;  here  all  is  the  free  unend- 
ing subjectivity  of  the  Ego;  now  "Ironie"  rules  where  objectivity, 
or  nature,  had  reigned  then.  He  himself  declares:  "Mein  Versuch 
uber  das  Studium  der  griechischen  Poesie  ist  ein  manierirter  Hymnus 
in  Prosa  auf  das  Objektive  in  der  Poesie.  Das  Schlechteste  daran 
scheint  mir  der  ganzliche  Mangel  der  unentbehrlichen  Ironie"1  Here 
we  see  that  Schlegel  himself  now  judges  that  the  "Ironie"  is  a  neces- 
sity in  poetry ;  we  also  perceive  the  influence  of  the  Fichtean  "Wissen- 
schaftslehre,"  in  changing  Schlegel's  doctrine  to  one  of  subjectivity. 

Schiller's  sentimental  poetry,  in  satire,  elegy  or  idyl,  set  forth  the 
relation  of  real  and  ideal ;  Schlegel  uses  the  word  "transcendental"  as 
noted  above;  it  is  the  opposite  to  naive.  He  writes  that  "Transcen- 
dental ist  was  in  der  Hohe  ist,  sein  soil  und  kann"2  and  that  transcen- 
dental poetry  has  its  entirety  in  the  relation  of  real  and  ideal,  and 
though  it  begins  as  satire,  showing  the  difference  of  ideal  and  real,  it 
soars  about  as  elegy,  and  ends  as  an  idyll  with  the  identity  of  the  two.3 

Transcendental  poetry  is  marked  by  reflexion  and  self-mirroring 
(Selbstbespiegelung)  and  will  become  the  "poetry  of  poetry."  Schlegel 
calls  Dante,  the  prophet,  Shakespeare,  the  centre  and  Goethe,  the 
climax  of  transcendental  poetry,  the  great  trio  of  modern  poetry  (der 
grosse  Dreiklang  der  modernen  Poesie).4  In  "Faust,"  "die  Ironie" 
is  noticed  in  "Ihn  treibt  die  Gdhrung  in  die  Feme;"5  "nicht  ein  Wunsch 
erf illlen  wird;"6  "0  dass  dem  Menschen  nicht s  Vollkommnes  wird, 
empUnd'  ich  nun"  ;7  "so  taumV  ich  von  Begierde  zu  Genuss,  und  im 
Genuss  verschmachf  ich  nach  Begierde;"8  "des  Ruhms,  des  Namens- 
dauer  Trug."9  Already  we  have  mentioned  "die  Ironie"  in  Meister." 
Schlegel  places  Goethe  as  the  greatest  poet ;  his  works  evincing  all  the 
characteristics  of  the  transcendental  Romantic  poetry,  united  with  a 
classic  style  of  beauty  and  simplicity.  As  "die  Ironie,"  the  unending 
strife  after  the  ideal,  hovers  over  transcendental  poetry,  so  in  the 
transcendental  philosophy  of  Kant,  we  perceive  the  same  unending 
longing  to  attain  a  goal,  although  it  was  not  then  called  "Ironie;" 
"We  have  traversed  the  whole  domain  of  the  understanding.  This 
domain  is  an  island,  and  enclosed  by  nature  within  limits  that  can 
never  be  changed.  It  is  the  country  of  truth,  but  surrounded  by  a 
wide  and  stormy  ocean,  the  true  home  of  illusion  (eigentlichen  Sitze 

i   Lyceum   §7.  6  1.   1557- 

2  Athenaeum    §    388.  7  1-  3240. 

3  Athenaeum    §   238.  8  1.   3249-50. 

4  Athenaeum   §  247.  9  Faust  I.  1.   1596- 

5  Faust  I.  1.  302. 


37 

des  Scheins),  where  many  a  fogbank  and  ice  that  soon  melts  away 
tempt  us  to  believe  in  new  lands,  while  constantly  deceiving  the 
adventurous  mariner  with  vain  hopes  (leere  Hoffnungeri),  and  involv- 
ing him  in  adventures  which  he  can  never  leave,  and  yet  can  never 
bring  to  an  end."1  This,  with  Kant,  became  the  unending  ethical 
activity  of  Fichte  and  later,  "die  Ironie/'  the  ceaseless  creative  fancy 
of  the  free  genius  of  Schlegel. 

Closely  related  to  "Ironie"  in  the  sesthetical  doctrine  of  Schlegel  is 
found  wit.  From  the  following  aphorisms,  wit  will  be  seen  to  be 
subjective,  arising  from  an  excess  of  spirit  and  casting  mysticism  and 
fantasy  over  the  poetic  art:  "Wit  is  unconditioned  social  spirit,  or 
a  fragmentary  ingenuity;2  wit  is  logical  sociability;3  it  is  an  "explo- 
sion" of  restrained  spirit;4  nothing  is  more  wretched  than  sad  wit;5 
mild  wit,  or  wit  without  a  point  is  a  privilege  of  poetiy;"6  a  prophet- 
ical power.7  Witty  conceits  are  the  proverbs  of  cultured  people;8  one 
should  have  wit,  but  should  not  wish  to  have  it  (man  soil  Witz  haben, 
aber  nicht  haben  wollen)  f  comic  wit  is  a  mixture  of  epic  and  iam- 
bic;10 wit  is  the  principle  (Prinzip)  and  the  medium  of  universal 
philosophy.  Kant  had  critical  wit  ;X1  humor  is  the  wit  of  sensation  ;12 
real  social  wit  is  without  a  crack  (ohne  Knall)  ;13  reason  is  mechanical, 
wit  is  chemical,  and  genius  is  an  organic  spirit  ;14  there  is  a  kind  of  wit, 
that  on  account  of  its  strength  (Gediegenheit),  fulness  (Ausfuhrlich- 
keit)  and  symmetry  may  be  called  the  architectonic  :15  wit  is  the  appear- 
ance, the  outward  flash  of  fantasy  (Blitz  der  Fantasie).  Therefore 
its  divinity,  and  the  resemblance  of  wit  to  mysticism,16  fantasy  and 
wit  are  everything  to  you — interpret  the  charming  appearance  and 
make  seriousness  out  of  the  play  (Ernst  aus  dem  Spiel),  so  you  will 
grasp  the  central  point  and  will  again  find  art  ;17  urbanity  is  the  wit  of 
a  harmonious  universality,18  one  can  only  think  of  wit  as  written,  like 
law ;  one  must  value  its  products  according  to  their  weight.19 

Wit,  therefore,  is  a  play  from  the  surplus  of  spirit  in  the  Ego;  it 
may  be  social,  logical,  comical,  humorous,  sad,  prophetical,  critical, 
powerful  or  fantastic,  but  it  always  is  subjective  and  sesthetical  and 
allied  to  "Ironie." 

"Die    Ironie"    with    Schlegel    has    various    phases;   the    idealistic, 

i   Krit.     der  reinen    Vernunft — s.  295 — Hartenstein   s.   214. 

2  Lyceum  §  9.                                                               11  Ath.  220. 

3  Lyceum   §  56.                                                             12  Ath.  237. 

4  Lyceum   §  90.                                                             13  Ath.  289. 

5  Lyceum  §17.  14  Ath.  366. 

6  Ly.   109.  IS  Ath.  383. 

7  Ly.   126.  16  Ideen  26. 

8  Ath.  29.  17  Ideen  109. 

9  Ath.  32.  18  Ath.  438. 
10  Ath.   156.  19  Ath.  394. 


38 

1 

aesthetical,  ethical,  religious,  logical,  and  pessimistic  in  its  result 
although  optimistic  in  its  start.  Let  us  examine  each  of  these  phases 
briefly,  accompanying  each  statement  with  Schlegel's  own  aphorisms. 

1.  "Ironie"  with  Schlegel  is  subjective  and  idealistic;  it  is  based 
upon  the  Ego's  fancy  and  the  self  positing  of  a  goal — "Die  Individuali- 
ty ist  das  Urspriingliche  und  Ewige  im  Menschen;  Die  Biidung  und 
Entwicklung  dieser  Individuals  at  als  hbchsten  Beruf  zu  treiben, 
ware  ein  gottlicher  Egoismus;1  again,  "Die  Philosophie  ist  eine 
Ellipse.  Das  eine  Centrum  ist  das  Selbstgesetz  der  Vernunft.  Das 
andre  ist  die  Idee  des  Universums;"2  "Nur  wer  einig  ist  mit  der  Welt 
kann  einig  sein  mit  sick  selbst."3  The  starting  point  is  the  Ego  and 
the  Ego's  inclination  to  strive  toward  an  ideal. 

2.  "Ironie"  is  aesthetical ;  it  is  founded  on  interest.  The  Ego,  as  a 
genius,  knows  no  law,  but  creates  an  ideal  toward  which  he  strives. 
The  ideal  is  ever  changing  according  to  the  never-ending  play  of  the 
Ego's  fancy.  "Nicht  die  Kunst  und  die  Werke  machen  den  Kunstler, 
sondern  der  Sinn  und  die  Begeisterung  und  der  Trieb/^  "Die  intel- 
lektuale  Anschauung  ist  der  kategorische  Imperativ  der  Theorie;"* 
here  we  perceive  the  Kantian  influence.  In  "Poetischer  Schein  ist 
Spiel  der  V orstellungen,  und  Spiel  ist  Schein  von  Handlungen"6  the 
idea  of  "play"  is  emphasized.  "Ironie"  is  very  marked  in  "Was  in 
der  Poesie  geschieht,  geschieht  nie,  oder  immer"1  and  the  disregard  of 
law  is  evident  in  "Der  Schein  der  Regellosigkeit."8 

3.  "Ironie"  is  ethical.  As  the  Ego  knows  no  law  in  art,  so  he  knows 
no  law  in  morals.  His  laws  come  from  within  and  he  seeks  freedom 
in  morality;  this  ended  in  vulgarity  in  his  "Lucinde."  Note  the  oppo- 
sition to  law  in  "Die  erste  Regung  der  Sittlichkeit  ist  Opposizion 
gegen  die  Gesetzlichkeit  und  konvenzionelle  Rechtlichkeit,  und  eine 
granzenlose  Reizbarkeit  des  Gemiiths."9  "Man  hat  nur  so  viel  Moral, 
als  man  Philosophie  und  Poesie  hat,"10  evinces  the  relation  of  the 
three,  as  also  "Athmet  ein  Werk  die  ganze  Fulle  der  Menschheit,  ist 
es  moralisch."11  "Alle  Selb standi gkeit  ist  ursprunglich,  ist  Originalitdt, 
und  alle  Originalitdt  ist  moralisch,  ist  Originalitdt  des  ganzen 
Menschen/'12  "Ironie"  is  ethical,  following  self-imposed  laws,  which 
exist  for  pure  enjoyment. 

4.  "Ironie"  is  religious,  for  the  Ego  enjoys  freedom  of  spirit. 
Religion  is  a  product  of  freedom;   "je  freier,  je  religibser;  und  je 

1  Ideen  60.  7  Ath.  §  101. 

2  Ideen  117.  8  Ath.  §  227. 

3  Ideen  130.  9  Ath.  §  425. 

4  Lyceum  §  63.  10  Ideen  62. 

5  Ath.  §  76.  11  Ideen  §  33- 

6  Ath.  §  100.  12  Ideen  §  153. 


39 

mehr  Bildung,  je  weniger  Religion/'1  "Die  Religion  ist  nicht  bios  ein 
Theil  der  Bildung,  sondern  das  Centrum"2.  "Frei  ist  der  Mensch, 
wenn  er  Gott  hervorbringt  oder  sichtbar  macht,  und  dadurch  wird  er 
unsterblich."z  The  unending  ideal  and  eternal  God  are  related  in 
"Wenn  jedes  unendliche  Individuum  Gott  ist,  so  giebts  so  viele 
Gbtter  als  Ideale.  Das  Verhdltniss  des  wahren  Kunstlers  und  des 
wahren  Menschen  zu  seinen  Idealen  ist  durchaus  Religion"4  "Wer 
Religion  hat,  wird  Poesie  reden."5  "Jcde  Beziehung  der  Menschen 
aufs  Unendliche  ist  Religion..  Das  Unendliche  ist  die  Gottheit."* 
With  Fichte,  "Wenn  das  Inter  esse  am  Uebersinnlichen  das  Wesen 
der  Religion  ist,  so  ist  seine  ganze  Lehre  Religion  in  Form  der 
Philo  sophie."1  "Was  der  freie  Mensch  schlechthin  constituirt, 
worauf  der  nicht  freie  Mensch  alles  bezeiht,  das  ist  seine  Religion."* 
"Ohne  Poesie  wird  die  Religion  dunkel,  falsch  und  bbsartig;  ohne 
Philosophic  ausschweifend  in  aller  Unzucht  und  wollustig  bis  zur 
Selbstentmannung.  "9 

5.  "Ironie"  is  logical.  It  sets  a  problem  but  it  is  not  able  to  solve. 
The  problem  of  the  gulf  between  the  real  and  ideal  presents  a  riddle 
too  difficult  to  be  unraveled.  It  has  to  do  with  Sein  und  Nicht — sein, 
and  its  very  being  is  "Reflexion."10 

6.  "Ironie"  is  optimistic  when  it  lays  stress  on  man's  ability  to  solve 
the  problem  of  the  real  and  ideal.  Soon  the  strife  is  found  to  be 
unending,  the  ideal  to  be  unattainable,  and  "Ironie"  becomes  pessim- 
ism. Man  fails  to  reach  the  goal  his  fancy  has  created,  there  is  no 
satisfaction  but  only  an  everlasting  "Sehnsucht"  and  "Weltschmerz." 

From  the  above  paragraphs,  we  find,  therefore,  that  "Ironie"  is 
idealistic  and  subjective ;  that  it  invades  the  realms  of  aesthetics,  ethics, 
religion  and  logic,  and  that  although  it  starts  out  on  an  optimistic 
basis,  it  soon  becomes  pessimistic  in  its  inability  to  solve  its  problem 
of  attaining  an  ideal. 

The  possession  of  "Ironie,"  or  the  power  to  create  ideals  makes 
man  a  genius j11  he  admits  no  limitation  to  his  creative  power,  he 
possesses  the  highest  virtue,  and  seeks  free  play  of  his  own  fancy. 
The  ordinary  individual  sees  the  established  limits  of  convention  and 
respects  these,  but  the  transcendental  poetical  and  original  Ego,  as  the 
Fichtean  Ego,  sees  only  what  he  himself  posits  and  what  he  may 
change  at  will;  he  plays  with  his  own  limits.  Genius  has  no  care, 
knows  no  law. 

1  Ath.   §   233.  7  Ideen   105. 

2  Ideen  §   14.  8  Id.   147. 

3  Ideen   §   29.  9  Id.    149. 

4  Ath.  406.  10  Ath.  §  305. 

5  Ideen  34.  11   Cf.    Erdmann   Hist,    of   Phil.,   Vol.   II,    §314:3. 

6  Ideen  81. 


40 

This  constitutes  morality,  an  opposition  to  law  and  custom  j1  the 
spiritless  man  fears  custom,  and  is  guilty  when  he  breaks  a  law,  but 
the  person  of  genius  is  free  from  it.  This  is  also  religion,  the  highest 
enjoyment  of  one's  own  freedom.2 

With  Schiller,  the  genius  makes  his  own  laws ;  is  simple  and  naive 
in  his  manner,  uniting  perfection  of  art  and  morality.  With  Schopen- 
hauer a  genius  is  an  Ego  possessing  excess  of  power  and  surplus  of 
knowledge ;  one  who  has  freed  himself  from  the  service  of  the  will ; 
Kant's  genius  is  an  intelligence  that  works  like  nature ;  Lombroso  puts 
genius  akin  to  madness  and  Plato  expresses  it  as  "those  who  come 
into  the  sunlight  from  a  dark  cave,  cannot  afterwards  see  properly." 

Schlegel  calls  genius  an  "instinct  for  unrestricted  caprice  ;"3  or 
"genius  is  a  system  of  talents."4  In  another  aphorism,  "not  unre- 
stricted caprice  but  freedom  as  wit,  love  and  faith."5  "  Some  have 
genius  for  truth ;  many  have  genius  for  going  astray  ;"6  "genius  is  an 
organic  spirit  ;"7  "every  complete  person  has  genius.  True  virtue  is 
inventive  genius."8 

As  stated  above,  the  genius  knows  no  law  and  morality  for  him 
constitutes  opposition  to  all  law. 

In  his  "Lucinde,"  Schlegel  attempts  to  show  contempt  for  all  rules 
and  laws  which  may  repress  man's  freedom.  Fichte's  Ego  with  its 
self-contemplation  lends  itself  as  foundation  for  the  novel.  He 
accepts  Goethe's  "Meister"  as  a  typical  novel  and  attempts  to  produce 
a  similar  one.  Beginning  with  an  "allegory  on  boldness"  (Allegorie 
von  der  Frechhcit),  in  which  he  contemplates  the  novels  he  will  under- 
take in  future,  he  promises  wit  and  fantasy,  which  are  the  chief  char- 
acteristics of  poetry. 

The  story,  copying  "Meister,"  as  it  does,  deals  with  the  life  of  a 
youth,  Julius.  This  Julius,  an  artist,  roams  about  seeking  satisfaction. 
Nothing  interested  him  except  while  untried.  He  lives  a  life  of 
sensuous  enjoyment,  but  in  the  moment  of  greatest  passion,  would 
analyze  his  feelings  with  unfeeling  coldness.  Finally,  he  meets 
"Lucinde,"  who  like  himself  feels  contempt  for  the  world's  proprieties. 
"She  lived  in  a  world  of  her  own  building  and  creating  (selbstge- 
dachten  und  selbstgebildeten)  .  .  .  she  had  broken  all  bonds  and 
all  deference  (Riicksichten)  and  lived  free  and  independent  (frei  und 
unabhangig)  ."9  Julius  now  feels  a  life  of  happiness  dawn  before 
him ;  he  has  found  a  new  feeling  which  he  may  study.     They  live  in 

i   Athenaeum  425.  6  Ath.    §  265. 

2  AtHenaeum  406.  7  Ath.    §   366. 

3  Char,  und  Kr.  s.  170   (Minor  II)  8  Ideen   §   36. 

4  Ath.   §    119.  9  Lucinde   (Universal-Bibliothek-Keclam.) — s.  61. 

5  Lyceum  §    16. 


41 

supreme  bliss  and  love.  "Love  is  not  only  the  quiet  longing  for  the 
unending;  it  is  also  the  holy  enjoyment  of  a  beautiful  present  (Genus s 
einer  schonen  Gegenwart).  It  is  the  complete  unity  of  mortal  and 
immortal   (Sterblichen  und  Unsterblichen).1 

"Lucinde"  is  an  expression  of  Schlegel's  theory  of  sesthetical  free- 
dom, but  here  it  enters  the  realm  of  morality.  Freedom  of  the  Ego 
is  the  basis  of  the  romance ;  opposition  against  form  and  order,  against 
law  and  custom  is  the  spirit  of  the  work.  It  raises  the  ironical  free 
will  and  egotistic  self -enjoyment  to  a  high  plane. 

As  the  man  of  genius  is  above  law,  so  real  morality  consists  in 
defiance  of  any  existing  code.  Actions  will  be  called  immoral  by 
those,  who  are  not  in  the  same  class  with  the  genius. 

"Lucinde"  is  a  war  against  the  conventional.  It  is  Romantic  free- 
dom of  the  Ego  applied  to  society.  Marriage  for  the  man  of  genius 
is  not  a  sacred  institution.  He,  therefore,  disregards  it  and  is  capable 
of  true  love,  existing  in  a  natural  marriage.  We  have  here  the  highest 
form  of  happiness  derived  from  absolute  freedom,  in  gratification  of 
the  spiritual   (above  custom),  and  the  sensuous  side  of  the  Ego. 

This  also  is  religion;  "For  what  God  can  be  worthy  of  honor 
to  the  man  who  would  not  be  his  own  God  (zvelcher  Gott  kann  dem 
Menschen  ehrwiirdig  sein,  der  nicht  sein  eigener  Gott  ist)  ?"2 

In  the  following  he  sets  forth  his  opposition  to  limitations ; 
"Friendship  is  partial  marriage  and  love  is  friendship  on  all  sides  und 
universal  friendship  in  all  directions.  Knowledge  of  the  necessary 
limits  is  the  most  indispensable  and  the  most  rare  in  friendship.3" 
Again  in  "What  one  calls  a  happy  marriage,  relates  itself  to  love,  as 
a  correct  poem  does  to  an  improvised  song"4  and  "Almost  all  mar- 
riages are  only  concubinages,"5  he  shows  contempt  for  legal  marriage. 

"Lucinde"  was  an  attempt  to  gain  freedom  in  morality  as  had 
been  done  in  poetry,  religion  and  philosophy.  Great  emphasis  was 
laid  on  the  Ego  and  the  Ego's  creative  fancy,  which  is  "die  Ironie." 
This  freedom  Schlegel  admits  into  all  departments  of  culture  and  life. 

5.  Contrast  of  Socratic,  Christian  and  modern  irony. 

We  have  learned  that  with  Schlegel  "Ironie"  means  the  painful 
sense  which  predominates  when  the  individual  cannot  pass  from  the 
reality  to  the  ideal.  The  Ego  is  ever  creating  by  means  of  his  fancy 
unattainable  goals,  and,  when  not  gained,  gloom  and  despair  follow. 

1  Ibid.  s.  69. 

2  Lucinde    s.    30.      Cf.    Nathan   der   Weise   s.     56.        (Univ.     Bibliothek.) 

3  Athenaeum  359. 

4  Ath.  268. 

5  Ath.  34.  _         , 


42 

With  Socrates,  we  find  an  irony  which  is  rhetorical  rather  than 
metaphysical.  His  was  an  artistic  and  humorous  play  by  which  he 
led  his  opponents  on  in  argument  until,  by  a  clever  question,  he  turned 
their  own  arguments  against  themselves.  This  irony  was  optimistic 
and  self-contained;  he  feigned  ignorance  for  the  purpose  of  snaring 
his  antagonist.  His  "accustomed  irony"  was  humorous  and  subtle ;  he 
humbled  himself,  putting  the  opposing  opinions  in  the  foreground, 
until  these  fall  to  the  ground  after  his  humble  questioning.  He 
knew  human  nature  and  as  a  master  of  irony  brought  out  the  incon- 
sistencies of  human  nature.  The  reader  of  the  Platonic  dialogues  can 
scarcely  distinguish  between  the  real  and  the  assumed  wisdom  of 
Socrates.  The  irony  prevents  it.  In  the  "Theaetetus,"  he  plays  both 
parts,  charging  his  own  arguments  with  unfairness  and  arrives  at  no 
conclusion.1  In  the  Philebus,  he  says,  "I  cannot  tell  you,  rather  God 
will  tell  you,  if  there  be  any  God  who  will  listen  to  my  prayers."2  The 
triumphs  of  this  irony  consist  in  the  overthrow  of  false  ideas  through 
clear  demonstration  of  the  truth. 

Schlegel's  "Ironie"  was  not  humorous  or  artistic;  on  the  contrary, 
it  was  very  practical,  resulting  in  Weltschmerz  and  pessimism  as  the 
longing   and   strivings   could    never   be   realized.     As    Riickert    says: 

"Vor  jedem  steht  ein  Bild  des,  das  er  zverden  soil; 
So  long  er  das  nicht  ist,  ist  nicht  sein  Fricde  poll* 

Renan  calls  Christ  "Le  grand  maitre  en  ironie."  This  irony  ot 
Christianitv  arises  from  discontent  with  the  world  and  life  and  a 
desire  for  an  ideal  existence  in  another  realm.  Schlegel's  "Ironie" 
creates  images  which  must  come  to  naught ;  Novalis  creates  a  world 
which  is  a  "dream;"  Christian  irony  consists  in  the  disappointment 
resulting  from  the  comparison  of  the  reality  of  this  world  and  the 
ideals  created  by  the  spirit.  The  Christian  religion  is  founded  upon 
pain  and  evil ;  the  Christian  makes  ideals  and  suffers  because  he  cannot 
realize  these.  Human  life  cannot  attain  to  the  spiritual,  and  so  despair 
succeeds.  This  is  the  "Ironie."  The  Christian  must  negate  the  world 
and  find  God  and  this  is  where  the  struggle  comes. 

Christ  is  like  Socrates  in  the  irony  on  a  few  occasions:  He  knew 
the  Gospel  was  the  universal  one,  but  He  talks  as  one  believing  in 
local  gods  when  He  converses  with  the  woman  of  Samaria  in  St.  John 
IV:  20,  21,  24,  and  again  when  talking  to  the  Syro-phenician  woman 
in  St.  Mark  VII:  28.     In  the  rest  of  His  teaching,  Christ's  irony  is 

1  Theaetetus    (for    Protagoras    166-168);    vs.    doctrine    183E. 

2  Philebus    (Jowett's    trans.) — 25. 


43 

like  that  of  Schlegel,  a  painful  life  founded  on  evil  and  suffering,  and 
a  struggle  to  realize  an  ideal. 

Modern  "Ironie,"  as  said  above,  is  the  strife  between  reality  and 
the  ideal  which  Schiller  brought  forth  in  his  "Spieltrieb"  in  art,  and 
which  was  followed  by  Schlegel  in  the  "Ironie;"  by  Novalis  as  a 
Traum,  and  finally  by  Schopenhauer  in  irrational  pessimism. 

As  Goethe  in  "Werther"  says,  "But  alas!  when  we  have  attained 
our  object,  when  the  distant  there  becomes  the  present  here,  all  is 
changed  again ;  we  are  as  poor  and  circumscribed  as  ever  and  our  souls 
still  languish  for  unattainable  happiness."1 

Many  were  influenced  and  affected  by  the  "Ironie,"  and  tried  to 
solve  the  problem  by  art,  philosophy,  religion  or  morality,  but  the 
ideal  is  not  yet  attained  and  the  W  eltschmerz  still  abides. 

6.    SchlegeVs  Influence. 

A. 

The  influence  of  Schlegel's  "Ironie"  is  felt  in  the  realm  of  phil- 
osophy, literature  and  religion.  Among  the  philosophers  we  will  briefly 
examine  Novalis,  Schelling  and  Solger. 

Schlegel  says  of  Friedrich  von  Hardenberg,  or  Novalis,  that  "Nicht 
auf  der  Granze  schwebst  du,  sondern  in  deinem  Geiste  haben  sich 
Poesie  und  Philosophie  innig  durchdrungen.'"1  Schlegel's  conception 
of  the  Ego  creating  a  world,  which  after  all  is  only  ideal,  is  accepted 
by  Novalis;  for  him,  the  world  is  merely  the  dreamy  creation  of  the 
fancy;  "Die  Welt  wird  Traum,  der  Traum  wird  Welt"z  He  is  the 
"Prophet  of  Romanticism,"  and  assigns  to  poetry  the  task  of  solving 
the  problem  of  life.  To  the  ideals  of  Romanticism,  he  gave  expres- 
sion in  "Heinrich  von  Ofterdingen;"  this  was  in  opposition  to  "Wilhelm 
Meister,"  which  he  considered  prosaic,  with  its  industrialism  and  com- 
mercial affairs,  a  growth  away  from  the  artistic.  "Heinrich"  is  a 
nature  allegory,  setting  forth  the  poetry  in  life;  it  is  full  of  Romantic 
longing,  the  search  for  an  ideal.  Here  it  is  happiness  which  will  be 
attained  when  Heinrich  finds  the  "Blue  Flower."4  The  first  part  is 
called  Expectancy  (Die  Erwartung)  and  the  second,  Fulfillment  (Die 
Erfullung)  ;  the  latter  was  left  unfinished.  The  search  of  Heinrich 
is  in  vain,  and  even  in  his  dreams,  when  the  flower  seems  near,  in  a 
moment  it  is  gone.  He  cannot  gain  the  longed-for  happiness.  It  is 
an  endless  search,  a  nameless  longing,  all  dreamy  Zauberei,  a  play  of 
his  imagination. 

i  Bohn     Lib.     ed. — Werther — p.     267     (letter    June    21). 

2  Ideen — An   Novalis — s.    307    (Minor). 

3  Novalis  Schriften  (Berlin  1815)  I  s.  219. 

4  Novalis  Schriften  (Berlin  1815)  I  s.  9. 


44 

The  "Blue  Flower"  is  symbolic  of  the  Romantic  School  and  typifies 
the  longings  of  a  poet's  soul. 

In  Novalis,  we  discover  the  influence  of  Kant's  "free  beauty"  and 
Schiller's  "free  play,"  of  Fichte's  individualistic  idealism,  of  Goethe's 
egoism  but  an  opposition  to  his  utilitarianism,  and  lastly,  of  Schlegel's 
concept  of  "Ironie"   (Lieblingsbe griff  der  Ironie).1 

With  Schlegel,  "Ironie"  is  the  wavering  freedom  of  the  Ego, 
Novalis  applies  the  fantastic  freedom  to  the  world;  Schlegel's  is  the 
freedom  of  the  reason,  Novalis'  is  the  freedom  of  the  spirit 
(Gemuths)  :  it  makes  the  world,  a  myth,  a  fantasy,  only  a  product 
of  the  imagination.2 

Novalis'  writings  have  been  characterized  as  mystical  subjectivism, 
magical  idealism  and  musical  phantasy;3  they  are  laden  with  moral 
and  religious  sentiments  but  over  all  is  felt  the  phantasy  of  nature. 
Nature,  however,  is  only  the  product  of  the  Ego,  only  a  "Traumbild," 
a  dream-world4  and  we  are  only  despairing  players.5  "Die  Welt  ist 
Resultat  eines  unendlichen  Einverstdndnisses,  und  unsre  eigne  innere 
Pluralitdt  ist  der  Grund  der  Weltanschauung.9 

He  calls  philosophy  a  longing,  "eigentlich  Heimweh,  ein  Trieb 
uberall  zu  Hause  zu  sein."1  In  his  "Fragmente"  he  speculates  on  all 
possible  truths,  such  as  "Goethe  ist  der  wahre  Statthalter  des  poetischen 
Geistes  auf  Erden*  "Des  Dichters  Reich  sei  die  Welt,9  die  Blumen- 
welt  ist  eine  unendliche  Feme,10  die  Indkndualitdt  in  der  Natur  ist 
unendlich,11  die  individuelle  Seele  soil  mit  der  Weltseele  ubereinstim- 
mend  werden12  die  Phantasie  ist  der  stofF  des  Verstandes,18  Philosophic 
ist  die  freie  eingebildete  Kunst,1*  der  Traum  ist  bedeutend  und  pro- 
phetisch,  well  er  eine  Naturseelenwirkung  ist,  wie  Poesie;  durchaus 
frei;15  wir  sind  in  und  ausser  der  Natur;1Q  Der  Liebe  gehts  wie  die 
Philosophic,  sie  ist  also  das  Ich — das  Ideal  jeder  B estrebung ;17  Kann 
ein  Ich  sich  als  Ich  setzen,  ohne  ein  anderes  Ich  oder  nicht-Ich?"18 

As  Schlegel  was  dependent  on  the  Fichtean  Ego,  so  also  was 
Novalis.  His  philosophy  and  morality  are  interchangeable;  at  the 
base  of  all  is  the  Ego  and  his  will,  but  the  power  of  nature  is  over 
him.  He  knows  no  law,  and  uses  nature  as  symbolic  of  his  poetical 
inspirations.     "The  barrier   (Scheidewand)   between  fable  and  truth, 

i  Haym  s.  379.  9  s.  186. 

2  Haym    s.    380.  10  s.  192. 

3  Haym    s.    377,   378.  11  s.  197- 

4  Novalis    Sch.    (Berlin    1846)    III    s.    155.  12  s.  203. 

5  Novalis     Sch.     s.     157.  13  s.  224. 

6  Novalis    Sch.    CBer.    1815)    II    s.    152.  14  s.  275. 

7  Novalis    Schriften    (Berlin    1815)     II  s.          15  s.  293. 
118.  16  s.  309. 

8  Novalis  Schriften     (Berlin   1846)    III.  s.          17  s.  316. 

164.  18  s.  320.  '  I 


45 

between  past  and  present  is  cast  down;  faith,  fantasy,  and  poetry 
disclose  the  inmost  world,"1  and  this  world  is  only  a  "Zauberstadt"  a 
dream. 

With  Schelling,  in  his  aesthetics,  we  find  again  the  opposition 
between  reality  and  ideal,  causing  a  struggling  in  the  artist's  soul. 
The  ancients  felt  no  opposition  and  there  is  no  indication  of  a  strife 
in  their  art  and  sculpture;  the  "Venus  of  Milo"  is  calm  and  com- 
placent; the  face  is  beautiful,  but  it  lacks  expression.  The  modern 
artist  feels  the  relation  between  the  finite  appearance  and  his  ideal. 

Schelling  speaks  of  an  unconscious  will,  creating  these  ideas,  which 
are  more  "divinely  beautiful  in  his  vision  than  upon  his  canvas." 
Modern  art  sets  forth  the  struggle  of  the  soul,  and  its  suffering.  The 
modern  feels  his  inability  to  produce  his  ideal;  all  is  dark  striving. 

Schelling  carries  the  same  idea  into  philosophy;  his  was  a  nature 
philosophy,  and  he  regards  nature  and  spirit  as  two  aspects  of  the 
"world-soul;"  Nature  is  the  visible  spirit,  the  spirit  is  invisible  nature 
for  him.  His  philosophy  led  to  mysticism.  His  chief  service  in 
Romanticism  was  in  his  aesthetics,  and  there  nature  and  spirit  were 
to  be  identified,  were  to  be  blended  in  art;  art  was  to  harmonize  all 
contradictions  when  it  reached  perfection ;  the  unconscious-conscious 
activity  of  the  genius  will  abolish  all  antitheses.  "Art  is  the  true 
organon  of  philosophy;  science  and  philosophy  are  one-sided,  and 
never  completely  develop  the  subjective  reason;  art  is  complete  as 
entirely  realized  reason."2 

Schelling's  doctrine  again  caused  the  Neo-Platonic  conception  of 
beauty,  as  phenomenal  manifestation  of  the  Idea  in  the  sensuous,  to 
be  recognized.  The  relation  between  finite  and  infinite  agreed  with 
Schlegel's  principle  of  irony  and  Solger  made  this  the  basis  of  his 
theory  of  art;  art  is  the  artist's  strife  for  his  ideal. 


B. 

In  the  realm  of  literature,  we  may  take  Tieck  and  Wackenroder 
as  exponents  of  Schlegel's  influence.  As  mentioned  above,  Tieck 
added  the  phase  of  picturesque  mystery  to  the  Romantic  movement. 
His  earlier  works  were  wild  and  horrible,  but  finally  he  finds  his  true 
self  in  the  world  of  legend  (Mdrchenzvelt).  His  love  songs  and 
nature  mysteries  are  attempts  to  explain  his  emotion,  his  fleeting  feel- 
ings ;  he  revels  in  the  supernatural,  in  allegories  on  Nature ;  he  talks 

i  Tieck's    Nachwort    zum    Ofterdingen    (.Novalis   Sch.    1815)    I.   258. 
2  Windelband — Hist,  of  Phil.  p.  607. 


46 

of  moonlight,  of  magic,  makes  the  bugle  the  instrument  of  Romantic- 
ism, and  envelops  the  reader  in  a  Romantic  haze  by  his  imagery. 

The  bewilderment  aroused  by  the  real  and  ideal  ended  in  the 
free  play  of  the  fantastic,  of  the  lyrical-musical  and  the  legends,1  as 
it  had  ended  in  the  poetical  "dream"  of  Novalis.  The  legend  lies 
between  reason  and  mystery.  Wackenroder's  love  for  the  beautiful 
aroused  his  earnestness  for  a  life  of  art;  for  him  art  is  holy  and 
divine;  it  is  a  religion.  His  conception  of  art  was  opposed  to  the 
classical  ideals  of  Goethe  and  Schiller,  and  the  art  of  Lessing.  His 
was  the  love  of  the  mediaeval  art,  the  Madonnas  of  Raphael  and  Hol- 
bein, the  art  of  Diirer;  he  gave  the  impetus  to  the  Madonna-worship, 
which  caused  many  of  the  Romanticists  to  become  Roman  Catholic; 
we  find  Novalis  inditing  a  verse  in  "Ich  sehe  dich  in  tausend  Bildern, 
Maria,  lieblich  ausgedriickt  u.  s.  w.2 

Wackenroder  however  loved  music  even  more;  "music  is  the  land 
of  faith,  where  all  our  doubts  and  sufferings  are  lost  in  a  tuneful 
sea."3  Tieck  agrees  with  him,  because  music  came  before  written  or 
spoken  language;  poetry  appeals  more  by  its  music  than  its  meaning 
and  love  needs  no  words,  as: 

"Liebe  denkt  in  siissen  Tonen, 
Denn  Gedanken  steh'n  zu  fern, 
Nur  in  Tonen  mag  sie  gern 
Alles,  was  sie  will,  verschonen."4 

Tones  are  the  language  of  the  soul  striving  to  express  its  inmost 
feelings. 

The  Schlegelian  influence  causes  Novalis  to  move  in  a  dream 
world  of  fantasy ;  Tieck  to  find  relief  in  the  legend  world  of  mystery 
and  Wackenroder  to  live  in  the  art  of  medievalism  and  the  world 
of  tone. 

C. 

In  the  realm  of  religion,  Friedrich  Schleiermacher  may  be  taken 
as  one  influenced  by  Romanticism.  Throughout  his  "Discourses  on 
Religion,"  he  makes  frequent  reference  to  the  importance  of  the 
individual,  as  did  Kant  and  Fichte,  and  also  to  the  ceaseless  activity 
of  the  universe,  which  is  ever  revealing  itself  to  us.  The  opposing 
activities  found  in  the  other  Romantics  are  also  voiced  by  him. 
Every   definite   thing,   according   to   Schleiermacher.   is    made   up   of 

i  Haym   s.   350.  4  Phantasien    fiber   die    Kunst — (1799)    s. 

2  Novalis    Schriften    (181 5)    II.    42.  246. 

3  Tieck-Phantasien   ii   die    Kunst  s.    150. 


47 

two  opposite  activities.  Each  life  is  a  manifestation  of  gain  and  loss. 
The  spirit  and  the  human  soul  are  created  by  two  great  impulses ;  by 
the  one  impulse,  the  soul  strives  to  establish  itself  as  an  individual; 
by  the  other,  it  longs  to  surrender  itself  to  the  whole,  to  be  absorbed, 
fearing  to  stand  alone.1  Those  in  whom  one  impulse  alone  exists 
are  not  living  in  the  nature  of  humanity.  This  longing  to  be  one 
with  the  whole,  the  striving  to  unite  the  individual  with  the  living 
World-spirit  is  the  ideal  of  religion.  The  pious  man  can  see  the 
operation  of  the  World-spirit  in  all  that  belongs  to  human  activity.2 
He  understands,  through  contemplation,  that  the  individual  is  one 
form  of  humanity,  and  that  humanity  is  one  form  of  the  unity  of 
spirit  and  matter. 

But  above  this,  is  the  feeling  of  some  higher,  closer  union  of  the 
two,  a  feeling  which  cannot  be  described.  The  striving  individual, 
"the  fruit  of  opposing  views"  stands  contrasted  with  the  quiet,  uni- 
form whole.3  He  longs  to  be  united  with  it,  and  this  is  attained 
through  feeling,  a  living  contact  with  the  world.  "In  man  is  an 
insatiable  longing  for  ever  stricter  purification,  ever  richer  fulness. 
.  .  .  What  do  you  call  that  feeling  of  unsatisfied  longing  which 
is  directed  toward  a  great  object?  .  .  .  With  Christians  this 
holy  sadness  is  the  dominant  tone  of  all  their  religious  feelings."4 
Personality  must  be  "annihilated"  and  we,  lost  in  the  Infinite,  become 
one  with  it.5  "Whosoever  loses  his  life  for  my  sake,  shall  find  it."6 
The  impulse  to  establish  individuality  must  be  lost  by  union  with  the 
whole,  by  which  the  individual  is  absorbed.  The  strife  will  then  be 
over.  This  is  the  nature  of  true  religion,  the  ideal  religion  of 
Schleiermacher,  when  we  reach  a  sense  and  taste  for,  and  a  feeling 
of  absolute  dependence  on  the  Infinite. 

The  "Ironie"  of  Schlegel  will  be  overcome  when  religion  becomes 
ideal  and  the  striving  ceases.  Schleiermacher  speaks  of  "play"  also. 
He  declares  that  all  imaginative  natures  have  some  stirrings  of  piety; 
also  that  they  fail  in  mastering  the  essential,  as  "a  light,  changing 
play  of  beautiful,  charming  but  merely  fortuitous  and  subjective  com- 
binations satisfies  them."7  In  his  tribute  to  Novalis,  he  says  that  "his 
whole  contemplation  was  a  poem ;  and  that  when  artists  become  pious 
the  great  resurrection  shall  be  celebrated.8  He  indicates  that  art  may 
be  an  aid  to  the  attainment  of  the  ideal  religion  and  that  play  of  the 
imagination  may  be  important,  after  all. 

i   On    Religion — trans,  by   John    Oman,    p.         5  Ibid.  p.   137. 

3,    4-  6  St.  Mark    VIII,   35- 

2  Ibid  p.  84.  7  On  Religion  p.    133. 

3  Ibid.  p.  81.  8  On  Religion  p.  41. 

4  Ibid.  p.  245. 


48 

Schleiermacher  was  powerfully  under  the  influence  of  the  Roman- 
ticists, when  he  wrote  "On  Religion,"  and  in  the  unsatisfied  longing 
we  see  echoed  the  "Ironie"  of  Schlegel.  Religion  starts  with  the  Ego 
and  revelation,  portrays  his  longings,  feelings  and  sadness  and  finally 
absorbs  him  in  the  Infinite.  So  peace  can  be  secured.  Schlegel  gives 
the  problem  of  strife  and  Schleiermacher  answers  with  religion,  aided 
by  art.  "Lucinde,"  he  opposed  and  yet  found  that  it  contained  his 
own  theory  of  the  union  of  soul  and  body.  Later  he  breaks  from 
the  Romanticists;  from  the  mere  exaltation  of  feeling  and  intuition 
(Gefuhl  und  Anschauung)  to  a  feeling  which  gives  reality  to  knowl- 
edge and  a  substance  to  morals  and  his  religion  becomes  historical  and 
positive.  This  feeling  of  absolute  dependence  in  monotheism  produces 
the  harmony  of  the  Ego  and  the  Infinite. 

7.     Schlegel' s  Effect: 

A. 
On  the  dramas  of  Grillparzer  and  the  poetry  of  Lenau,  the  effect 
of  "Ironie"  is  felt.  Grillparzer  depicts  the  conflict  of  will  and  cir- 
cumstances ;  his  novels  are  full  of  the  bitterness  of  disappointed  hopes, 
a  cry  for  inspiration,  or  the  mockery  of  unhappy  love.  In  "Das 
goldene  Vlies,"  no  rest  comes ;  all  is  strife  and  sorrow ;  it  is  a  tragedy 
of  pessimism : 

"Was  ist  der  Erde  Gluck? — Ein  Schatten! 
Was  ist  der  Erde  Ruhm? — Ein  Traum!"1 
"Des  Meeres  und  der  Liebe  Wellen"  is  a  love-tragedy  ending  in  the 
death  of  Hero  and  Leander;  "Der  Traum  ein  Leben"  depicts  desire 
and  ambition,  without  power  of  realization;  it  represents  a  dream  full 
of  terror  and  on  awakening  Rustan  decides: 

"Des   Innern  stiller  Frieden 
Und  die  schuldbefreite  Brust! 
Und  die  Grosse  ist  gefahrlich, 
Und  der  Ruhm  ein  leeres  Spiel; 
Was  er  gibt,  sind  nichtige  Schatten, 
Was  er  nimmt,  es  ist  zu  viel  !"2 

Grillparzer  sought  this  "inner  peace";  the  nothingness  of  fame,  of 
happiness  and  love  is  the  burden  of  all  his  plays.  The  noblest  form 
of  heroism  is  renunciation,  the  highest  virtue  is  contentment. 

Nikolaus  Lenau's  poems  are  full  of  melancholy  pessimism  and 
discontent.     All  his  poems,   elegaic   and  pessimistic,   are   filled   with 

1  Sammtliche    Werke     5 — 228     (Stuttgart  1892-94). 

2  Werke  7 — 2 141. 


49 

despair;  he  voices  the  pessimism  of  his  time,  the  inability  to  realize 
the  ideal.  His  works  are  depressing.  Even  when  he  seeks  freedom 
in  America,  he  calls  it  a  land  "voll  traumerischen  Trug,"  and  returns 
to  Europe.  "Faust"  is  full  of  scepticism  and  despair  and  "Savonarola" 
and  "Die  Albigenser"  are  pessimistic. 

B. 

In  the  realm  of  philosophy,  with  Schopenhauer,  the  endless  play, 
the  "Ironie"  becomes  irrationalism.  Here  we  have  the  absolute 
unreason  of  an  objectless  will.  "The  world  is  my  idea,"1  existing  only 
in  relation  to  the  Self;  otherwise  it  has  no  reality.  "The  world  is 
my  will,"2  that  is,  the  will  is  objectified  in  various  grades  of  inorganic 
life,  plant,  animal  and  man.  All  gravitation,  locomotion  and  growth, 
in  fact,  all  forces  are  only  will.  The  will  creates  itself  perpetually  and 
is  never  satisfied ;  so  misery  ensues.  The  will  is  the  thing-in-itself ,  and 
life  and  the  phenomenal  world,  the  mirror  of  the  will,  or  its  objectivity. 
By  negation  of  the  will-to-live,  misery  will  be  lightened  by  morality. 
By  art  and  science,  misery  will  be  overcome.  Art  will  emancipate 
man  as  "the  beautiful  is  that  which  pleases  without  stirring  the  will." 
In  art,  the  artist  becomes  absorbed  in  nature,  feels  the  sublimity  and 
loses  himself  in  the  contemplation  of  infinite  greatness.  He  feels 
himself,  as  the  condition  of  all  objective  existence;  he  transcends  his 
own  individuality  and  becomes  one  with  nature.  In  painting,  he  feels 
the  objectification  of  his  inner  nature  and  communicates  it.  We  may 
use  the  Hindoo  formula  "tat  twam  asi"  (the  living  thing  art  thou) 
to  express  these  objective  manifestations. 

A  genius,  Schopenhauer  says,  has  a  surplus  of  energy;  "it  is  as  if, 
when  genius  appears  in  an  individual,  a  far  larger  measure  of  the 
power  of  knowledge  falls  to  his  lot  than  is  necessary  for  the  service 
of  an  individual  will,  and  this  superfluity  of  knowledge,  being  free, 
now  becomes  subject  purified  from  will,  a  clear  mirror  of  the  inner 
nature  of  the  world."3 

This  denial  of  the  will,  this  freedom,  is  only  partial  denial,  as  all 
are  not  artists,  nor  can  we  be  sesthetical  all  the  time.  All  can  be 
moral  all  the  time,  however,  so  we  can  obtain  complete  denial  by 
moral  asceticism.  In  religious  art,  resignation  is  expressed  as  the 
spirit  of  Christianity  and  Indian  philosophy.  Tragedy  represents  the 
strife  of  will  with  itself;  purified  by  suffering,  it  becomes  quiet  and 
resigned. 

i  The    World   as   Will    and   Idea— Bk.    I,  §    I. 

2  Ibid.,    Bk.    II,    §    18. 

3  Ibid.,  Bk.  Ill,   §  36. 


50 

Time  in  all  phenomena  (Kant),  becoming  and  never  being  (Plato), 
and  the  web  of  Maya  (Vedanta)  are  all  dependent  on  the  principle 
of  sufficient  reason.  The  will  is  life,  the  will-to-live;  it  belongs  to 
the  present,  not  past,  nor  future.  The  world  is  will  and  phenomenon 
is  will  objectified.  There  is  negation  of  the  will,  but  if  no  will,  there 
is  no  world — nothing.  As  we  abhor  annihilation,  we  will-to-live  and 
are  nothing  but  will ;  all  strife,  a  weary  longing  and  complaining  with- 
out aim  or  end.  To  those  that  deny  the  will,  as  ascetics  and  sufferers 
as  Goethe's  "Gretchen,"  peace  will  come  and  salvation. 

We  assume  three  extremes  in  life:  first,  Radscha-Guna,  the 
powerful  active  will,  or  the  strong  passion,  which  appears  in  great  his- 
torical characters;  second,  pure  knowing,  the  freeing  of  knowledge 
from  the  will,  the  life  of  genius  or  purity  (Sattwa-Guna)  ;  third, 
lethargy  of  the  will,  or  ignorance,  empty  longing  (Tama-Guna).  The 
Ego  wavers  between  these,  suffering,  longing  and  dreaming  until  death 
comes.  Life  is  a  tragedy  of  never  satisfied  wishes  and  frustrated 
hopes.  "By  contemplation  of  the  life  and  conduct  of  saints  and  by 
art,  we  banish  nothingness  which  is  behind  all  virtue  and  holiness  as 
their  goal;  we  do  not  evade  it  as  the  Hindoo,  by  reabsorption  in 
Brahma  or  Nirvana."1  We  acknowledge  that  after  the  abolition  of 
will,  nothing  remains.    Our  world  is  nothing ;  all  is  no  more. 

On  the  philosophy  of  Schopenhauer,  Wagner  worked  out  a  theory 
of  music.  Schopenhauer  writes  "Music  is  as  direct  an  objectification 
and  copy  of  the  whole  will  as  the  world  itself  .  .  .  it  is  not  like 
the  other  arts,  the  copy  of  the  Ideas,  but  the  copy  of  the  will  itself, 
whose  objectivity  the  Ideas  are."2  Wagner  accepts  this  theory  that 
music  is  based  on  the  will.  Tone  forces  its  way  into  the  world,  as  the 
immediate  utterance  of  the  will.  It  represents  the  greatest  excitation  of 
the  will.  Plastic  art  is  merely  a  representation  by  means  of  the  intellect 
and  is  distinguished  by  greatest  quietude  of  the  will.  Wagner  also 
makes  use  of  the  "Spieltrieb"  of  Schiller  and  the  allegorical  "dream" 
of  Novalis. 

The  musician  is  "like  one,  who  awakening  from  deepest  sleep,  uses 
all  his  efforts  in  vain  in  the  endeavor  to  recall  the  blissful  dream  of 
his  soul."3  We  awaken  with  a  cry,  and  we  immediately  enter  the  world 
of  sound.  So  art,  arises  from  a  cry.  In  plastic  art,  we  feel  repose 
in  perceiving  the  object  presented  to  our  view,  but  not  so  in  music. 
Music  is  an  idea  in  Self.  It  is  not  beheld,  but  is  felt  in  the  depths  of 
consciousness.     The  outer  world  disappears.     Music  occupies  all  our 

i  Ibid.,   Bk.   IV,   |    71. 

2  Bk.  Ill,   §   52. 

3  On  Beethoven,  trans,  by  A.  R.  Parsons,   p.   69. 


51 

attention,  now  creating  the  highest  joy,  now  moving  us  to  tears.  The 
musician  cries  from  his  inmost  soul,  and  the  most  certain  answer  is 
given  by  music.  It  can  stir  and  arouse  our  sympathies.  Music  is  sub- 
lime; it  can  cause  the  highest  ecstacy  and  with  Christianity  can 
exclaim  "Our  kingdom  is  not  of  this  World."  It  is  like  the  revelation 
of  a  dream,  like  the  cry  of  fright  on  awakening  from  a  fearful  dream. 
The  will  calls  from  within,  which  is  answered  by  a  counter-call  from 
without.  "So  call  and  counter-call  become  a  'play'  with  itself."1  The 
power  of  producing  something,  to  set  forth  the  never-experienced,  the 
never-seen  in  joy.  "All  the  pain  of  existence  is  shattered  upon  the 
immense  pleasure  derived  from  the  play  with  it."2 

This  seems  to  argue  that  art  will  relieve  and  overcome  the  pain 
found  in  the  world  of  Schopenhauer.  The  great  artist  may  laugh 
at  misery.  He  belongs  to  another  realm.  After  a  portrayal  of  anguish, 
unfulfilled  desire,  torment,  rage,  love,  misery,  sorrow,  or  rapture,  the 
mighty  player  smiles  to  himself,  for  the  incantation  was  to  him,  after 
all,  only  a  "play."3  The  spirit  of  music  soars  aloft  from  within  the 
consciousness,  leading  us  in  the  path  of  redemption.  Art  will  emanci- 
pate man.  Music  is  a  cry  of  the  composer's  soul,  striving  to  set  forth 
the  ideas  he  feels. 

Like  the  "Thathandlung"  of  Fichte's  Ego,  the  "Spieltrieb"  of  Schil- 
ler and  Kant,  the  "Ironie"  of  Schlegel,  "der  Traum'  of  Novalis,  the 
striving  of  Schleiermacher  and  Schelling,  the  unreason  of  Schopen- 
hauer's will,  is  the  call  from  the  soul  of  the  musician.  All  reach  out  for 
a  goal  too  far  removed.  All  is  a  dream  of  something  that  never  was 
and  never  will  be. 

Friedrich  Nietzsche  applies  Schopenhauer's  thought  to  Wagner's 
musical  drama,  presenting  art  as  a  salvation  from  the  torture  of  the 
will.  Certainly  this  seems  true.  In  "Tannhauser,"  "Lohengrin"  and 
"Der  fliegende  Hollander,"  we  see  the  powers  of  darkness,  or  evil, 
opposed  to  those  of  light.  In  each,  we  find  salvation  sought  through 
a  woman's  love.  Redemption  comes  only  with  the  death  of  the  one 
tested.  In  "Der  Ring  des  Nibelungen,"  is  set  forth  the  struggle  for 
the  ring.  It  is  obtained  successively  by  Alberic,  the  Nibelung,  Fafnir 
the  Giant,  and  Siegfried;  but  what  does  it  bring  them?  Only  death 
and  unhappiness  till  the  Rhine-maidens  get  back  their  own.  The  curse 
of  the  ring  and  its  powers  are  destroyed  but  the  race  of  Volsungs  is 
ended  and  "Gotterdammerung"  has  come.  The  waking  of  Brunhilde 
brought  only  disappointment. 

i   Ibid.,    p.    31. 

2  p.   64. 

3  P-  73- 


52 

In  "Tristan  and  Isolde,"  Wagner's  theme  of  love  is  once  more 
portrayed.  No  fulfillment  of  happiness  in  life ;  in  death  they  are  united. 
"Happiness  cannot  overtake  the  swift  course  of  woe."  "Rienzi,"  Wag- 
ner's earliest  opera,  sets  forth  the  story  of  the  "Last  of  the  Roman 
Tribunes."  His  ambition  to  free  Rome  ends  only  in  the  destruction  of 
the  capitol  by  those  he  sought  to  liberate,  and  in  the  death  of  Rienzi 
and  his  devoted  sister,  Irene.  His  life  was  sacrificed  to  the  love  he 
bore  Rome. 

"Parsifal,"  his  last  drama,  is  festive  and  yet  is  full  of  evil  and 
temptation.  Finally,  wise  through  pity,  Parsifal  heals  Amfortas,  and 
redeems  Kundry,  who  dies.  Then  the  Grail  glows  with  light,  and  a 
white  dove  descends  in  heavenly  benediction ;  but  even  in  the  exaltation 
of  Parsifal,  we  know  that  Titurel  must  now  die.  This  last  is  a  sort 
of  transfigured  pessimism.  We  feel  in  "Parsifal"  also  the  fatalism  of 
the  East  and  Nirvana. 

Nietzsche  began  as  a  follower  of  Schopenhauer  and  Wagner,  but 
finally  worked  out  a  new  philosophy  for  man's  salvation.  He  creates 
heroes,  and  the  hero,  the  "U r ebermensch"  is  the  man  with  the  strong 
will,  the  self-asserting  genius,  who  has  risen  above  his  fellows  and  rules 
them.  This  assertion  of  individualism  is  like  that  of  the  Romantic 
pioneers.  Mankind  is  to  be  ruled  by  the  tyranny  of  culture,  the 
"U ebermensch."  "Die  Umwerthung  aller  Werthe,"  and  "Die  Wieder- 
herstellung  des  Gleichen"  (cf.  Zarathustra  and  Confucius),  represent 
the  writer's  philosophy.  He  had  in  his  nature  much  of  Schlegel's 
genius,  which  is  based  on  "Ironie."  He  could  not  find  his  way  back 
from  the  individual  mind  to  the  universal  Ego,  to  the  conception  of 
values,  which  are  valid  for  all.1 

In  Herman  Sudermann,  we  find  embodied  the  realism  of  life;  the 
feelings  of  evil  and  misery  set  forth  in  Schopenhauer.  Poverty,  dis- 
honor, loss  of  love  of  home  through  ambition  are  portrayed  in  his 
works;  in  his  last  cycle  called  "Roses,"  he  continues  the  mysterious 
reality  and  dark  side  of  life  and  each  closes  with  disappointment  and 
unattained  hopes. 

Gerhart  Hauptmann  also  writes  in  a  crude  realistic  manner.  "Die 
Weber"  and  "Vor  Sonnenaufgang"  are  full  of  misery,  "Hanneles 
Himmelfahrt,"  full  of  naturalism  and  romanticism,  a  wretched  family 
and  the  vanishing  dream  of  a  child.  "Die  versunkene  Glocke"  is  a 
Marchendrama,  full  of  imagination  and  symbolism.  The  bell  founder, 
Heinrich,  seeking  the  ideal,  typifies  human  aspiration ;  he  leaves  the 

i   Windelband    Hist,    of   Phil.    p.    680. 


53  .......  .    ■•«  .  \.  s  „ 

realistic  figures  of  his  home  to  follow  Rautendelein,  the  fairy  who  typi- 
fies the  freedom  of  the  soul  and  lends  him  strength  to  climb  the 
heights.  His  egoistic  ambition  ends  in  death.  The  piece  is  filled  with 
the  self-assertion  of  the  will  and  the  end  of  ambition  in  death. 

Heinrich  Ibsen  is  a  pessimist  and  an  idealist.  He  portrays  the 
gloomy,  sombre  side  of  life;  he  argues  that  life  must  be  purified  by  love 
and  based  upon  individual  will.  In  "Peer  Gynt,"  the  "Be  thyselt ;  to 
thyself  be  sufficient,"  is  the  prevailing  theme.  In  Brand,  "I  am  what  I 
am."  Both  men  failed;  their  freedom  kills.  We  must  compromise — 
"Go  roundabout."  Like  the  Bhagavat  Gita  "Nothing  is  greater  than 
I ;"  like  the  will  of  Schopenhauer,  so  is  the  Ego  of  Ibsen.  The  doctor 
in  "Peer  Gynt"  declares  "Each  one  shuts  himself  up  in  the  barrel  of 
self ;  with  the  self-bung  he  seals  it  hermetically."  The  Ego  is  all.  In 
"The  Master  Builder,"  ambition  meets  with  death  as  it  did  in  Haupi- 
mann's  "Die  versunkene  Glocke." 

These  three  authors  emphasize  the  power  of  the  Ego  and  his  will, 
and  are  examples  of  Schopenhauer's  influence,  and  in  turn,  of 
Schlegel's  "Ironie." 

Schopenhauer  returned  to  Vedanta  and  his  work  is  filled  with  the 
Asiatic  pessimism.  "In  the  world,  there  is  no  study  so  beneficial  and 
elevating  as  that  of  the  Oupnek'hat.  It  has  been  the  solace  of  my 
life;  it  will  be  the  solace  of  my  death." 

His  own  philosophy  of  the  objectified  Ego  contains  much  of  the 
fundamental  doctrines  of  the  Upanishads.  He  makes  frequent  refer- 
ence to  the  "tat  twam  asi"  and  the  Maya,  or  deceptive  web  of  the 
world.  He  thinks  the  pantheism  of  India,  is  destined,  sooner  or  later, 
to  become  the  faith  of  the  people.  "Ex  oriente  lux."  As  the  Hindoo 
philosophy  ends  in  annihilation  of  the  Self,  Schopenhauer  would  abol- 
ish will  and  thus  the  world  would  be — nothing.  His  pessimism 
excludes  all  hope  of  a  race  development.  It  is  a  pessimism  which  ends 
in  the  negation  of  the  will  and  the  cessation  of  existence. 

IV.  Conclusion. 
In  the  survey  of  Self  as  a  subjective  principle,  as  seen  previously,  a 
philosophy  will  culminate  in  nihilism;  in  Vedanta,  there  must  be  anni- 
hilation of  Self  and  absorption  in  Brahman  to  attain  Nirvana;  with 
Socrates,  he  must  deny  his  own  Self  in  order  to  make  others  see  the 
truth ;  in  Christianity,  the  Self  must  be  affirmed  against  the  world,  but 
must  become  one  with  the  Infinite  to  find  salvation,  the  individual  must 
lose  Self  in  order  to  find  it  again  in  the  Kingdom  of  God ;  the  Cartesian 


54 

Self  must  be  blended  in  the  one  true  substance,  which  is  God.  The 
Fichtean  Ego  strives  in  endless  activity  to  realize  itself  in  the  self- 
posited  world,  which  exists  to  develop  the  character  of  the  Ego. 
With  the  Fichtean  Ego  is  marked  the  transition  to  the  Romantic 
School.  Here  the  philosophy  does  not  end  in  nihilism  of  the  Self,  but 
the  endless  activity  will  end  in  pessimism.  The  Ego  posits  a  goal,  but 
this  is  ever  changing  and  never  reached.  The  Romanticist  starts  in  the 
pure  idealism  of  Fichte ;  he  sets  up  his  own  ideal,  the  fruit  of  his  imag- 
ination. This  activity  is  at  first  "mere  play"  but  gradually  the  vague 
longing  for  the  ideal  "Die  Ironie"  develops  into  a  vain  struggle,  a  cease- 
less strife  for  a  goal,  which  when  the  Ego  finds  he  cannot  reach, 
envelops  him  in  pessimism  and  misery.  He  sets  up  art,  philosophy  and 
religion  as  means  for  salvation  in  this  painful  kingdom  of  time  and 
space,  but  they  cannot  fulfill  the  task  imposed. 

From  a  "mere  play"  of  the  faculty  of  the  imagination,  an  outlet  of 
superfluous  energy,  "Die  Ironie"  grew  into  a  serious  pessimism,  into  an 
aspect  of  life,  which  life  Disraeli  describes  as  "youth,  a  delusion ;  man- 
hood, a  struggle;  old  age,  a  regret."  Ambition  meets  with  reverse  as 
Napoleon  aiming  to  rule  the  world  met  his  Waterloo ;  the  hand  of  des- 
tiny is  the  "Ironie"  of  life. 

The  period  that  dawned  with  the  "play"  in  art,  poetry  and  philoso- 
phy, has  set  with  a  "Weltschmerz"  casting  the  philosopher  into  the 
gloom  of  pessimism  and  irrationalism. 

The  Self  as  a  ruling  principle  in  philosophy  culminates  in  nihilism 
of  the  Self,  or  in  a  painful  pessimism,  from  which  misery.no  art,  no 
philosophy,  no  religion  has  as  yet  proven  the  savior. 


